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SOCIALIST

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DEMOCRACY AND THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION A SYMPOSIUM

André Philip

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THE PSYCHOSIS OF POVERTY MICHAEL HARRINGTON

BERLIN: A KEY TO THE WORLD CRISIS ALEX GARBER

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60 YEARS OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY

THE SOCIALIST PARTY of America was founded sixty years ago last November. During these six decades, the world has changed almost beyond recognition. At their beginning, Russia was a backward, semi-feudal nation; Europe held a majority of mankind in imperialist subjugation; and the United States was an adolescent power preoccupied primarily with rounding out its internal economic development.

Today, Russia and China contend for hegemony within the vast domains of the Communist imperial complex, and for leadership of its world movement. South Asia, Africa and Latin America are in the midst of a political and social revolution of incalculable scope. And the United States has assumed the role of organizer and arbiter of the capitalist world in its struggle to survive and contain the great upheaval of the second half of the century.

During the sixty years, the Socialist Party has been an integral part of the American scene. Its contribution to American life could never be measured by its numerical strength, or its electoral record.

There was a time when the SP elected hundreds of candidates to local office, and its member led many thousands of workers, farmers and others in unions, co-operatives and popular organizations of all kinds. The party was a major source of material aid to workers engaged in the fierce struggles for union recognition and human decency of the first four decades of this century. It educated millions in the ideas of social reforms which, once regarded as visionary, have been incorporated into the basic framework of American society.

These contributions, important as they were to America's development, were shared by liberals, trade unionists, and social reformers of many political persuasions. What has been, and remains the unique contribution of the Socialist Party is its steady commitment to extend the principles of democracy and justice into every aspect of national and even international society.

We are not talking here about the programs adopted by the party conventions through the years, or even about the ultimate goals of a society based on principles of democratic socialism. What we are talking about is a movement whose participation in the struggles of the American people is not guided by considerations of "practical politics," which simply means partisan advantage. We are talking of a movement which is so committed to the idea of democracy, in its fullest sense, that while it may make mistakes, the one mistake it does not make is to abandon the interests and rights of the meanest of its fellow-Americans or the weakest and most backward peoples of some other nation, in the interest of immediate advantage.

What distinguishes socialists from liberals is that our commitment to democracy and justice for all is not limited by adherence to the economic and political dogmas of capitalism. The Socialist Party has long since abandoned a simplistic faith in public ownership as a panacea for all the ills of society. This has not diminished our conviction that efforts at reform can only have limited effect as long as crucial economic controls and decisions remain in the hands of a tiny clique of corporate owners and executives whose responsibility is not to society, but only to themselves.

Growth of urban slums, inadequacy of medical care, job discrimination against Negroes which is at the root of all forms of discrimination, growing and irreducible

unemployment, unequal justice in the courts—these problems and many others resist the efforts of liberal reform. They resist, because the reformers draw back from an assault on the citadels and shibboleths of corporate private property.

And in foreign policy, this commitment to private property plays even greater havoc, if possible, than it does at home. American foreign policy has accepted the sheer impossibility of basing its alliances and support on guarantees of capitalist orthodoxy from its partners and clients. Lip service is given the idea that America must support the "revolutionary wave" in the underdeveloped countries if Communism is to be contained. Yet the fact remains that there is a built-in bias in favor of governments and popular movements which keep their social programs well within capitalist limits. This bias tends to vitiate even those programs to which socialists and liberals alike give their strongest support.

The Socialist Party seeks to participate in every battle for reform as part of the "liberal left," as this term is understood in its broadest sense. In these struggles, we retain our own identity, because we are compelled to recognize a structural tendency on the part of organized American liberalism to compromise its professed principles in the name of "practical politics." This tendency is structural, because it reflects the role organized liberalism plays within the American political structure.

The progressive, democratic forces in American society will be able to use their full strength for social advance only when they disentangle themselves from the bonds which tie them to reactionary forces within the present party system. The Socialist Party is convinced that this disentanglement will take place not through intellectual exercises, but through hard and persistent struggle for social and political objectives.

It is in the magnificent struggle of Negroes for first-class citizenship now; in the growing peace movement; in the fight against the dead hand of political bossism; in the struggle to establish social responsibility for the effects of automated unemployment—here is where America's future is being decided, and here is where the Socialist Party participates together with men and women of other political views and affiliations.

Our participation in these movements is limited only by the numbers of our members and the material resources at our command. Though these are smaller than they have been at some times during the past sixty years, they are well above the low-point of the past decade, and show every sign of continued growth.

We have said above that socialist influence cannot be measured by numerical strength or electoral record. That was never truer than it is today. The contribution we bring to the struggles in which we participate along with millions of non-socialists, is our faith that democracy—the ability of the people to run their own affairs—can and will be established in all areas of American life.

This is the faith by which we live. Can anyone be sure that unless America—and the world—learn to live by it also, they will be able to live at all?

Democracy and the Colonial Revolution

A SYMPOSIUM

I. SOCIALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

André Philip

THE WEST today watches the evolution which is taking place in the so-called under-developed countries with surprise and fear. Having just achieved their national independence, and eager to raise their living standards, they borrow Western technical methods without being able to understand our basic philosophy. Anxious to increase capital investment as rapidly as possible, they use methods which annoy us because they violate the democratic principles to which we are accustomed.

To interpret this phenomenon, I wish to formulate four basic hypotheses:

1. Without large-scale and planned outside help, rapid economic development demands *forced savings* from the interested country, i.e. less consumption and increased poverty in the first phase of development.

2. These painful sacrifices cannot be expected to be voluntary in a country where the population is still primitive, incapable of rational action and of imposing upon itself the necessary discipline to achieve future benefits. Democracy cannot work in this phase. Progress must be imposed by an elite, which can be composed either of en-

trepreneurs who make tremendous profits and reinvest them liberally, or by civil servants who levy huge taxes so as to finance planned investment. The choice between private capitalism and state capitalism varies according to country and epoch.

3. These minorities are creative if they are inspired less by the profit motive or by a thirst for power than by a religious or social myth which leads them to work devotedly while at the same time restricting their own consumption, thus making investment possible.

4. Democracy becomes possible only when, on the one hand, progress in education has made it possible for the people to reason logically, to organize their lives rationally, to accept immediate sacrifices for long-range goals; and, on the other hand, when the

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existence of a sub-structure and of sufficient equipment allows an increase in consumer goods and a sizeable reduction of the sacrifices needed during the transitional period.

Democracy becomes *necessary* in order to limit the power of the dominant aristocracy, whether private or public, and to prevent it from sinking into an ossified bureaucracy, interested in its own privileges and thwarting further economic development. *Democracy is, therefore, not a natural human characteristic; it is rather the miracle, always unstable and threatened, of a certain kind of civilization at a certain degree of its development.*

A Look At History

These hypotheses have been proven during the birth of modern European capitalism. It was prepared by a cultural evolution lasting several centuries: the urban communes of the XIIIth Century, the Great Explorations, the Renaissance and then the Reformation formed elites that were capable of thinking rationally about the world and of organizing economic activity within the framework of certain generally respected ethical rules. The standard of living and the cultural development of the Europeans was higher than are those of the under-developed countries today.

It is obvious, nonetheless, that the Industrial Revolution in Europe occurred when a *minority* of entrepreneurs forced painful structural modifications upon an unwilling majority. The enclosure movement in England made technical progress in agriculture possible at the price of the pauperization of the small peasant and artisan. Modern factories gradually replaced home industry. Competition brought about the elimination of medieval rules for the protection of labor. If the British Parliament had at that time been a truly representative body, technical progress would have been stopped, or at least slowed down. In fact, true power belonged to the new entrepreneurs, most of whom were of Puritan origin and who were less interested in making profits than in serving God. Profit to them was primarily a sign that they were blessed. It was regarded as a trust, to be put to work through reinvestment, and not to be spent on luxurious living.

This religious-technical elite remained dominant for more than a century. It was only in the middle of the Nineteenth Cen-

tury, when agricultural and technical progress permitted an important improvement in the standard of living, that such rights as freedom of association, the right to strike, and universal suffrage were achieved. This became possible in a relatively short time because of the widespread trend of investment toward light industry (textiles in particular).

Japan Modernizes

The Japanese industrial revolution passed through a similar evolution. It was not initiated by the mercantile classes created during the Shogun era but by the lower ranks of the aristocracy who reestablished centralized power and restored the emperor's authority. The captains of industry and the high civil servants, who often belonged to the same family and were constrained by the authority of the same elder brother, sought neither power nor profit, but the service of the emperor-god. They lived austere, reinvesting entirely the tremendous profits they made from the exploitation of the workers and most particularly the peasants. The latter until the end of the Nineteenth Century, were able, because of progress in education and technical help, to furnish more than 80% of the budgetary and financial resources required for the growth of the new industries.

In France, on the other hand, the Revolution of 1789 brought about a democratic explosion *before* the advent of modern industry. The result was a *much slower rate of economic growth*, linked perhaps to a more humane tempo of life. The predominance of small peasant holdings has for a long time prevented modern technical agricultural methods from being used; these are only now being introduced. Heavy industry did not begin to develop until the Second Empire and the end of the Nineteenth Century saw political control by the petite bourgeoisie which, allied to the new workers' movement, tried to bring about a *more equal distribution of the wealth than the slow rate of economic growth justified*. The result was nominal improvements, combined with a permanent inflationary trend and political instability, which disappointed the masses and which were caused by the too slow growth of the gross national product.

The experience of the U.S.S.R. is similar to the first two. In this case the creative minority were not entrepreneurs but rather

bureaucrats dedicated to a religious order, the Party, with Heaven being replaced by dialectical materialism. As in the other cases, the elite were motivated by an idealistic goal and were able to force the indispensable sacrifices from the ignorant masses. These sacrifices were all the more cruel since investment was entirely concentrated in heavy industry. Thus organized exploitation of the masses, such as Marxism had predicted, took place in the U.S.S.R. more systematically than in any Western country. It is only recently, since Khrushchev took power, that industrial progress has been such that the standard of living of the people has risen and it has been possible to direct the country, if not towards democracy, then at least towards the reestablishment of certain fundamental rights.

In fact, we observe the same phenomenon everywhere: *democracy is not possible unless the people have attained a certain level of education and the productive apparatus a certain capacity*. At that point, democracy becomes indispensable in order to limit unbridled power, which is always dangerous whether in the form of private property or of the administrative appropriation of the means of production.

More Difficult Problem

The under-developed countries have the same problems but under much more difficult conditions. They still do not have the required rational intellectual training. Their traditional cultures are often directed toward the primacy of contemplation, with disdain for work and for action. Their primitive agriculture is dominated either by the clan or by the big landowner, while the distribution of agricultural products is left to the usurer who holds the peasant at his mercy. In addition, an *agricultural revolution and the organization of agricultural markets* are the *sine qua non* for any efficient economic or political action in these countries.

The next step then is to impose the indispensable *forced saving*, but this is much more difficult than in the Europe of the Nineteenth Century. England was able for fifty years to endure great poverty because the situation was worse elsewhere. But the Africans and Asians of today know, or at least have heard tell, of the higher living standard in the West. They want to raise their standards as quickly as possible, which

makes saving more difficult and, in fact, threatens to force the spending in advance of wealth yet to be made.

There are few entrepreneurs who are capable of establishing and investing this saving. There are, of course, men who seek profits. But, because profit to them is a goal and not a manifestation of a higher reality, they will not accept the slowness and risks of agricultural or industrial investment, preferring to speculate with both rural and urban land. The rapid profits realized from this are, moreover, usually wasted in ostentatious display for purposes of social prestige.

State Capitalism

Since true entrepreneurs are not available, *state capitalism* seems to be the only possible solution in most of these countries, and the intellectual elite almost always enters public service. But the idea of the state as public service is too often absent. The natural tendency then, because it is traditional, is to place power at the service of one's family and friends. In order to overcome corruption and nepotism, those who govern need time and truly ferocious energy. They also need a *live-giving myth* which, under present conditions, can only be *nationalism*. A country which has just won its independence can transfer its now expendable warlike energies to the fight for economic progress, and can then impose the indispensable sacrifices in the name of its still-threatened national independence. It is also essential that this anxiety for independence does not lead to the imposition of a *military budget* that is larger than the net profit formerly realized by the colonial power.

It is clear that, in such a situation, democracy—such as we practice it in the West—is not only impracticable but dangerous. Parliamentary institutions in particular when transferred to these countries become the means of control by the traditional powers, the big landowners, as well as the instruments of corruption and nepotism. Therefore these people usually tend, in the first phase, to find a leader whom they can identify as the incarnation of the country. As paternal protector, he can defend the country against the privileged classes and can thus impose the necessary sacrifices for a better future.

The demagogic dictators declare they are men of the Left and speak of Asian or African socialism. In the sense that socialism is the expression of the democratic ideal in economic and social life, it is obvious that it does not exist here. What does exist is *authoritarian state capitalism*, mercantilism à la Colbert, in which a powerful bureaucracy, personified by a glamorous chief, takes the destinies of the country in hand and forces upon it the indispensable sacrifices necessary to its economic awakening.

Totalitarian Phase

But such an authoritarian regime may lead rather quickly to the calcification of the governing elite if it is not opposed by some force and dialogue. The dictator, the military junta or political party becomes the governing class. Cut off from the peasants and the young intellectuals, it invites opposition which easily leads to violent convulsions and to anarchy. It is, therefore, essential to pass through the authoritarian phase quickly and to prepare the adoption of a democracy adapted to the country's needs.

This means first a systematic educational effort. This does not mean the formation of an elite while leaving the masses in ignorance. Rather it does mean *first* to assure professional training and basic education which gives every man the chance to advance. It means the training of teachers before university students, of nurses and midwives before medical specialists, of county agricultural agents and of village councillors before engineers.

Having created its basic structure, the plan for economic development must then seek to improve agricultural production and to establish minor consumer goods industries which are capable of satisfying the demands of the people. It is to the degree to which the people will feel an immediate, though minimal, improvement in their standard of living, that they will make their contribution voluntarily. It will then be possible to use the available manpower as well as the unemployed hidden in the villages. This does not call for mobilizing the "masses" for big jobs through a combination of enthusiasm and terror which by no means disguises the establishment of forced labor. On the contrary, people should be mobilized for jobs like the construction of the schoolmaster's house, the school, the in-

firmary, to dig wells, to drain land, to improve roads. For these tasks, village manpower can mobilize itself because it can see the results of its labors.

Democracy Begins Below

The Indian socialists have been the first to state that *democratic experience begins in the village*. The experiment now being conducted in Dahomey by the Swiss consumer cooperatives shows how sensitive the Africans are to any effort based on village autonomy. Cooperative and mutualist ideas can often become the point of departure for democratic education in an underdeveloped country. A centralized plan prepared by experts and based on the creation of heavy industry inevitably leads to dictatorial totalitarianism. Preparation for democracy means a plan formulated decentrally, and carried out through local and cooperative initiative. It also means sufficient foreign aid to supply the cadre of technical teachers, the primary tools which are needed to overcome bottlenecks gradually and thus reduce to the minimum the inevitable sacrifices of a transition period.

The situation of the socialists in the underdeveloped countries seems, therefore, to be particularly delicate. At the beginning, they can only be an intellectual *minority*, independent of the governing elite, essentially devoted to the training of men and to popular education. Their task is to assure the liaison between the elite in power and the masses of peasants; to prepare the modernization of the village and the revival of artisan crafts; to insist upon the creation of consumer industries; to inspire the growing press and radio, women's and youth organizations, so as to establish *autonomous* forces which will be capable of engaging in a fruitful exchange of ideas with the elite in power.

The socialists must also be ready to participate in the exercise of power, without having illusions about the extent of their immediate accomplishment, and on the condition that they can get responsibility for such "educating" ministries as education, information, cooperation, planning. In this way they will be able to train men to become more free and, if the economic development plan is based on decentralization, they will be able to appeal to the grass roots, to the initiative and responsibility of the local young elite.

The structure of central power is not important at the beginning. We are not concerned here, as in Europe, in creating a centralized *state*, which is presumably controlled by a parliament elected every four or five years but which brings the daily life of the citizen under administrative control. It means rather preparing a free *society*, in which man will gradually be called upon to make decisions where he lives, where he works, within the framework of a general direction of social life. *Decentralized planning* is for these countries the road to democracy. Yugoslavia and Israel can be useful guides for them—more so than the West or the U.S.S.R.

Role of Industrialized Lands

The possible evolution of the underdeveloped countries depends to a great extent on the attitude of the industrialized ones. If they are left to their own devices, the imperatives of their economic awakening will push them to an increasingly authoritarian policy. Only aid that is generous, disinterested, and distributed as an *educating* process will help them to become receptive to the democratic spirit.

This means that we must make specific political choices:

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1. All vestiges of *political colonialism* must be liquidated as soon as possible, and we must recognize the right of all peoples to independence. It is possible that, at the beginning, power will fall into the hands of incompetent leaders and that the economic situation will become worse. But we must take this risk. Peoples, like individuals, can only learn from the experience of their own errors and *can only become responsible by exercising responsibility*.

2. But political colonialism must not be replaced by an *economic neo-colonialism* which would vitiate completely the value of the new political institutions. The existence of a so-called "free market" throughout the world subjects the producers of raw materials to sudden variations of prices which have made it impossible for them to have long-range plans. Moreover, the long term deterioration of terms of trade makes them liable to increased exploitation. In the last few years, the underdeveloped countries have lost more from the drop in the price of their commodity exports than they have gained from all forms of foreign aid. Independence, if it is to be real, implies an international agreement, or at least a series of regional agreements, which would *stabilize the prices of these basic commodities*.

Private Capital

In the same way, the life of a people cannot be subjected to decisions which come essentially from abroad. The investment of private capital is not only insufficient, it can be dangerous. It can give the economy of the country a direction contrary to that of its own long-term self-interest, unless it is done within the framework of a plan formulated in common by a group of interested countries and by those interested in helping them.

3. An international or regional plan then becomes indispensable. Foreign aid must not be given in the form of gifts but rather as a series of long-term, low-interest loans. It must be *public, supra-national and multi-lateral* in character; preferably it should be given through the channels of the United Nations. But it can also be valuable to have regional organizations (Colombo Plan, European-African Community, Club for Aid to India, etc.) if they have sufficient autonomy to be independent of both private interests and national policy. Prepared by the in-

interested country or countries, the plan for development must be discussed by these public institutions, and the countries which furnish capital, technicians or equipment must *transform their structures* to adapt them to the requests thus made.

The world free market cannot answer the needs of our period. Aid to the underdeveloped countries demands the rapid adoption of socialist methods of organization and of planning.

Multiple Planning

In fact, it seems as though we are moving towards a system of *multiple planning* in which after common study and discussion, the plan of the company, that of the state, of the region, and finally that of the supranational economic organism, will be super-

II. SOCIALIST ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

imposed upon the same territory. This is a system of decentralized planning which will prepare first *economic*, then *political* democracy.

This depends upon us. Left to themselves, the underdeveloped countries will feel impelled to impose upon their people the intolerable constraint of authoritarian power and will fall under the influence of the Soviet Union or of China. They will, on the other hand, gradually fall under democratic influence if efficient foreign aid permits them to limit to what is possible the sacrifices which they must impose upon their people. But this means that the industrialized West must abandon such ideologies as the free market, private enterprise, and neo-capitalism, even though modernized. Only if the West directs itself toward socialism will the other countries be tempted to experiment with democracy.

Robert J. Alexander

THE ISSUES of democratic Socialism are as relevant to Latin America and other "underdeveloped" parts of the hemisphere as they are to the highly industrialized nations. The growth of a mixed economy in which the State has a very large role is virtually inevitable. Whether the society which evolves on the basis of this mixed economy will be of a democratic socialist nature or will be totalitarian is by no means so clear.

Socialization of much of the economy of the Latin American countries is virtually inevitable. This socialization involves a wide degree of government ownership of the economy and extensive planning of the economic life of these countries.

The first fact with regard to Latin America which must be borne in mind is that the area is going through a profound so-

cial, economic and political revolution. This upheaval is a complex phenomenon. First of all, it involves the fundamental alteration of class and race relations in the area: ending the domination of the life of the region by the traditional landed and commercial aristocracy of European or largely European ancestry.

It also involves a spectacular increase in nationalism. The evolution of new middle groups based on the growth of modern mining, agriculture and manufacturing has brought this nationalism to the fore. The

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old landholding oligarchy had extra-national loyalties, feeling more sympathy and association with people of similar culture and wealth in France or Spain than with the peasants on their own haciendas. At the other end of the social scale, the Indian or Negro masses of the traditional Latin American society had parochial loyalties, to the tribe, the linguistic group, or even to the local landholder. To neither of these groups did the "nation" or "nationalism" mean anything concrete.

The Middle Groups

However, when the new middle groups—which are "middle" not only in the economic and social senses, but in racial terms as well—become a significant element in the community, these groups find nationalism an appealing philosophy. They do not have loyalty to the old ideas of either the oligarchy or the old lower class groups. Rejected by the upper class and despising the lower, they look for a new center for their loyalty. This they find in the nation, which gives them identification and is meaningful to them. They tend to be passionate nationalists.

There are two other things which are part of the Latin American Revolution. These are the desire for rapid economic development and the aspiration for political democracy.

Economic development, by which the Latin Americans mean principally industrialization, has been a passionately held objective in the area for about thirty years. As a result of the disastrous effects of World War One and the Great Depression, which cut the Latin Americans off from their sources of imported manufactured goods in Europe and the United States, the politically conscious people of the region became convinced of the need for having industries capable of producing these products for themselves.

Furthermore, the Latin Americans have become acutely conscious of the difference between their levels of living and those of the highly industrialized nations. They tend to explain these differences, perhaps a bit simplistically, by the presence of heavily industrialized economies in Western Europe and the United States.

They also feel that the diversification of their economies will make their nations more independent. So long as their coun-

tries earn their foreign exchange by selling only one or two agricultural or mineral raw materials or foodstuffs, and depend upon this foreign exchange for most of the manufactured goods consumed by their people, they are excessively dependent upon the countries which buy these exports.

Finally, there are military reasons for industrialization. The armed forces of the Latin American countries want manufacturing industries to provide at least some of the equipment which they use or might need to use in case of a conflict with their neighbors.

Democracy is also a widespread aspiration in Latin America. We shall have more to say about it a bit later in this article.

Government Intervention

It is against the background of this revolution in progress in Latin America that the problems of democratic socialism in the area must be judged. The drive for economic development and the nationalistic philosophy so prevalent in the area are two prime motives for government intervention in the economies of the Latin American nations.

One fundamental reason for extensive government participation in the economy in Latin America is the fact that only the government is capable of mobilizing the resources necessary for development. The elements in Latin America which receive large enough incomes to save and invest in factories, public utilities and other large-scale projects usually do not save and do not invest. The large landholders tend to spend all of their income, or when they do put aside any of it, they use it to buy more land, or at most, to buy urban real estate.

It is only governments which are able to raise sufficient funds for the construction of public utilities, iron and steel plants and other expensive enterprises. Furthermore, international lending agencies are usually willing to lend only to the governments of the Latin American countries (not to private investors) or to firms which can provide the government's guarantee that they will repay what they borrow. Thus most of the basic elements of a modern industrial economy in Latin America are usually owned by the government.

However, there are other reasons for government intervention in the Latin American economies. One of these is the desire

to establish national control of the basic economy of these countries. There are two aspects of this problem.

In the first place, the public utilities, railroads, and other key parts of the national economies of most Latin American countries were originally developed by private foreign investors. The Latin American countries have generally reached the conclusion that these sectors of the economy, which constitute its very backbone, should be in the hands of their own nationals. Generally, this means that the government must take them over. Since World War II, the movement towards nationalization of these aspects of the economy has been all but universal in the area.

Second, the principal producers of foreign exchange, such as mines and plantations, have also usually been developed by private foreign firms. There is increasing feeling that the petroleum, mines, and large scale plantations also should be in the hands of the national governments, or that at least the governments should permit foreign exploitation of these parts of the economy only under the most stringent conditions.

The Latin American countries increasingly realize the need for central planning of their economic development. There is an urgent need to allocate the scarce resources available in these countries so as best to favor economic growth and other policy objectives of the national government. There is need to mobilize investment resources within the country, and also to channel the available investment funds from international lending institutions. For this purpose, it is necessary to plan the main lines along which development should proceed.

Extent of Intervention

This kind of planning involves a number of things. First of all, it requires the careful direction of government expenditures. Second, it involves the direction of the use of the generally inadequate amounts of foreign exchange which are generated by the normal commercial transactions of the various countries of the area. Third, it involves the stimulation of private investment, through tax concessions and other means, in the fields where growth is particularly desired by the nations' planning authorities.

As a result of all of these factors, the intervention by the governments of Latin America in their economies is very extensive. It takes various forms.

The government-owned sector of the economies is already very extensive. Railroads are generally run by the government. Frequently, telephone and telegraph services are also. Electric utility firms are also increasingly passing into the hands of the State, with a tendency to develop national electric networks, both to provide essential power for industrialization, and to fill consumer needs of the people of their countries.

In Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, and Colombia all or part of the petroleum industry is in the hands of the government. There are government-owned steel industries in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Brazil and Venezuela also have state-owned petrochemical plants. Several countries manage other manufacturing industries and some also have large-scale plantation agricultural enterprises.

Of key importance to the state sector of the economy are the economic development banks and corporations. These government-owned institutions have considerable versatility. They establish and operate subsidiary firms, they invest in stock of privately-owned companies, they lend funds to private entrepreneurs. In some countries they constitute one of the principal organs of planning, as well as playing a key role in development.

Overall planning of the economy is of increasing importance in the Latin American countries. Since the middle 1930's, Mexico has had a series of six year plans, which have concerned themselves principally with the use of government funds for development. Venezuela has recently established a four year plan which centers attention on the use of government funds, but which also provides means for stimulating and directing private enterprise. Brazil has sought to plan the development of certain sectors of its economy, particularly in the Northeastern region.

Government Intervention vs. Socialism

Of course, a certain degree of government planning and state owned enterprise does not constitute socialism. Indeed, a great deal more government intervention in the economy than exists in most Latin American countries would not in and of itself be socialism, as democratic socialists understand the term.

Democratic socialism certainly involves the state orientation and direction of the econ-

omy for certain socially desirable ends. It also involves a considerable degree of government ownership and control of the key institutions of the economy. However, equally essential is the problem of the democratic control of the state and of the economy.

This issue of what constitutes socialism has been raised into a vital question for the hemisphere by the advent of the government of Fidel Castro in Cuba. Since May 1, 1961 Castro's Cuba has been officially proclaimed to be a "Socialist" country, and is now governed by the *Partido Unico de la Revolución Socialista Cubana*—the Only Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution.

This problem is only new in that this is the first time that it has been presented as a problem of immediate urgency in the Western Hemisphere. But in the world at large, it is as old as the Bolshevik Revolution. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Cuba of Castro is in no sense a "third force" regime, but one which is completely in the Soviet orbit. With the formation of the single revolutionary party, power in Cuba has passed to the leaders of the old Cuban Communist Party, the so-called *Partido Socialista Popular*. It was officially represented at the Twenty-Second Congress of the Soviet Party by Blass Roca, long-time secretary general of the PSP. Another old-time Communist leader and one-time member of General Fulgencio Batista's cabinet, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, has been made virtual dictator of the Cuban economy.

Serious Challenge

Castro and his regime present a serious challenge in Latin America. They say that it is impossible to carry out the long-overdue revolution through the democratic process or with the tolerance of the United States. This is the real issue behind the current crisis in Latin America and in relations between that part of the world and the United States.

The status quo in Latin America, the traditional semi-feudal and semi-colonial economic and social system, is dying. The real issue in the area lies between those who want to bring about the revolution in the way it has been done in Cuba, and those who wish to bring about the long overdue changes needed in Latin America through democratic processes.

All of the parties of the Left in Latin America have taken their stand on this is-

sue. Unfortunately, most of the parties which call themselves Socialist in Latin America have taken their position with Castro and against the democratic socialist revolution. The Socialist Parties of Chile and Uruguay had become enamored of Titoism even before the advent of Fidel Castro's regime, and have shifted their primary loyalties to him with great ease. Two of the three factions into which the Socialist Party of Argentina is divided are vying with one another to prove their allegiance to the Castro regime. The Brazilian party is also largely Fidelista.

National Revolutionary Parties

The most influential group of parties which are of democratic socialist orientation are the National Revolutionary parties. These include *Acción Democrática* of Venezuela, the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* of Bolivia, the *Apristas* of Peru, the *Liberación Nacional* party of Costa Rica and the *Febrerista* party of Paraguay, among others. The national revolutionary parties have allies in some countries, including Christian Democratic groups and in a few cases, the traditional Liberal parties.

One of the national revolutionary parties, *Acción Democrática*, is now in power. The regime which it leads in Venezuela is the most serious challenge to Fidelismo to be found in Latin America today. It is carrying out the social reform and economic development which is needed throughout the area, and it is doing so in a democratic fashion.

The Betancourt regime in Venezuela is carrying out an agrarian reform, which when completed will have transferred the ownership of land from large landholders to small peasants and to cooperatives. It is carrying forward an industrialization program, in which key elements including the steel plant, the petrochemical enterprise, the aluminum factory, will be in the hands of the state. It has established a government-owned oil firm, which will immediately enter into competition with the international firms which have been exploiting the country's oil resources, and when these companies' concessions run out, will take them over.

The Betancourt regime has an extensive Four Year Plan for the development of the nation's economy. It is developing a nationwide electric grid, a national highway sys-

tem, is opening up new areas to cultivation. At the same time, it is carrying out a spectacular educational program, has launched a rural housing scheme for the first time in the nation's history, and is extending rudimentary medical service to rural areas throughout the country.

The Democratic Way

All of this is being accomplished in a democratic way. The three powers of the state function freely, there are five major parties (including two Communist groups) which are competing for the public's favor, and a sixth party has recently been organized. Although some constitutional freedoms have been suspended since a Communist-organized attempt at insurrection at the end of last year, all political parties and other groups are able to carry on their normal activities indoors.

If the Betancourt regime succeeds in its program, there will come into existence in Venezuela a mixed economy, in which state-owned enterprises dominate the infra-structure, and in which the general economic development is directed in accordance with a national plan. However, it will be a society in which trade unions, peasant organizations, and other social organizations are

free to function as independent institutions. It will likewise be a democratic society in which the rulers are chosen by the votes of the ruled, and the civil liberties of free speech, press, organization and thought will be assured.

If the Betancourt regime succeeds, there will be a viable alternative to Fidelismo in Latin America. Political democracy will have a chance; there will be an opportunity to establish democratic socialism in this part of the hemisphere.

Conclusion

Thus, free enterprise has little appeal in Latin America. Under the pressures generated by nationalism and the drive for economic development, the state has assumed a wide role in the economies of Latin American nations. The essential issues are what form of organization will bring the most rapid economic development, and what institutions will best serve the national interests of these countries.

The real question in Latin America, therefore, is not whether this is to be a free enterprise area, but rather what form the revolution is to take in these twenty republics. The basic issue is between totalitarianism and democratic socialism.

Greetings from:

SEYMOUR M. LIPSET

Berkeley, Calif.

Fraternal Greetings

LEONARD HINDS

Chicago, Ill.

III. IS DEMOCRACY FOR WHITE MEN ONLY?

Rita Hinden

IN THE YEARS of their struggle for independence, it was taken for granted that the colonies in Asia and Africa would be democracies once they were free. The leaders of the nationalist movements called, with a mounting insistence, for the institutions of the mother countries, which they had learnt to admire and envy. Representative government, the rule of law—these were their aspirations.

British colonial rule (about which alone I can speak with authority) was thus directed, during its last years of power, towards the development of constitutions shaped, as closely as possible, on the 'Westminster model.' The Legislative Councils, which had existed for many years in the majority of colonies, were gradually broadened so as to become more and more representative; the franchise was extended; executive powers were bit by bit extended through the creation of ministerial, or cabinet systems; any infringement of civil liberties in the colonies was fiercely contested in Britain by the British champions of the colonial peoples. When independence came, beautiful new Parliament buildings were erected, and members of the Mother Parliament went out to grace their opening with copies of Erskine May (the handbook of British Parliamentary procedure) as gifts.

Only a few years have passed, and the bloom is off the rose. Of all the Asian ex-colonies, only in India, and perhaps Malaya, can democracy be said to have struck roots—and even in these countries it feels

itself under challenge. In Africa it is nowhere firmly established. High hopes centered on Ghana, which was the first of the African colonies to achieve independence. But today, scarcely five years after the transfer of power, Ghana is well on the road towards a dictatorship. The opposition is crushed, and 250 of its leaders languish in jail without trial. Civil liberties and the rule of law have been abandoned. In a number of the French ex-colonies, one-party systems are now the rule. Nigeria has had its independence for less than a year, and democratic hopes still run high, but it is far too soon to judge. In Tanganyika, which celebrated its independence in December, one political party (Julius Nyerere's) is already all-powerful, and hints have been thrown out about developing a democracy without an opposition party. In Nyasaland, there is also only one party worth speaking of (under Dr. Hastings Banda). And so the roll-call might be continued. He would be a brave man who would predict that democracy—as we know it in the West—will flourish anywhere on African soil.

It might be possible to argue, as many Westerners have done, that democratic systems require experience and maturity to work; that aberrations must be expected at

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the start; but that, in the course of time, the virtues of democracy will be revealed to the newcomers and they will set their compasses in that direction. This is not, however, how many Asians and Africans argue. They are challenging the very idea of democracy, and questioning its basic principles. They do this on two grounds.

First, they say, what our countries need, above all, is economic development. Ours are among the poorest in the world, and until our people are, at the least, well-fed, everything else must be considered a luxury. The best way to secure economic growth is by the mobilization of all one's resources—land, labor, capital—and to do this a centralization of power and authority is needed. The government must be given more or less authoritarian powers, and all this talk of checks and balances and oppositions and free trade unions independent of the government is irrelevant. Look at the successes in economic achievement which have been won by Russia and China under communist dictatorships! We do not want to be communists, but some sort of authoritarian government may be far more suited to our needs than the slow-moving methods of the democracies.

Economic Growth

The second argument is quite different. Democracy as you Westerners know it, they say, is alien to our traditions. To you the essence of democracy is the two-party or multi-party system; we prefer to work towards a consensus of opinion. We will permit criticism, but only from within our own ranks. We are used, right down to our village councils, to talk a matter out and then reach a decision by which all abide. If we are to be democrats, we will find our own forms; yours have no meaning for us.

Both these arguments have to be answered. Is it really true that great economic growth is only possible under authoritarian régimes? It is certainly true that economically Russia and China have taken vast strides forward during the last generation. But how does this compare with the growth in the U.S. fifteen years ago and of Britain in the last century? And what about the progress in Western Europe of recent years? Why has there been no comparable growth in the Communist satellites in Europe? What has been the cost of this growth to Russia and China—the terrible mistakes that have been made, the drastic failures in agricul-

ture, the famines and the purges? Look, too, at the accelerating speed of growth in India under her democratic five-year plans. Too little is known of the actual facts; too much has been left to Communist propaganda. Africans and Asians (most of them) have come to believe, almost implicitly, that they can only advance with speed in one way. I do not believe they are right. But if they are not, they have still to be convinced of their error.

I have said that too little is known of the actual facts. An attempt has recently been made by John Strachey to provide some of the material in a pamphlet, *The Great Awakening*, published by the London Journal Encounter. He compares the progress made in India and China since the war. Both countries are, of course, extremely poor. But according to the last figures he has, China is still poorer than India. In India the per capita income is now running at about \$77 per annum, in China it is about \$60.

This, of course, proves nothing about the rate of growth. According to the Chinese government figures, the total output—or Gross National Product—rose by twelve per cent a year between 1952 and 1958—an exceedingly rapid rate of growth. Since 1958 it has been impossible to get any reliable figures, but it is known that China has run into serious difficulties. It is not clear whether these are in the whole field of development, but there are certainly grave troubles in agriculture—which Strachey ascribes to the collectivization of peasant agriculture. (Collectivization, it will be remembered, has also done great damage to Russian agriculture.)

India's Progress

In the meantime, India, which got off to a slow start with her first Five-Year Plan, is now entering on her Third Five-Year Plan. At the moment the rate of growth in output is only about four per cent per year; it is expected to rise to 6 per cent during the course of the coming five years. But that is not the whole of the picture. The rate of accumulation, on which future progress depends, had been increased to 8 per cent of output at the end of the Second Plan; it is expected to rise to 11 per cent by the end of the Third Plan, and to 16 per cent by the end of the Fourth. The accepted view of most economists is that, for development really to get going, the rate of accumulation should be about 10 to 12 per

cent of output. If that is so, the Indian economy should get off the ground in a big way in the course of the coming five years. True, points out John Strachey, if one looks at the immediate present, China has done better than India. But he adds two afterthoughts. Ever heard the fable of the hare and the tortoise, he asks? And, which is the country which is developing at the fastest rate of all? A communist country? No. It is Japan, which claims to have attained the rate of 17 per cent in 1960. "Whether this is true or not, I don't know," he concludes. "It seems almost incredible, but they are certainly doing so at a very rapid rate indeed."

Look now at the second argument, that democracy is alien to African and Asian traditions. This springs from deep-seated misconceptions as to what democracy really is. Many people in Asia and Africa identify it with certain particular institutions which have been successful in Britain or France or the U.S., and with certain specific features such as universal suffrage (one-man one-vote), majority rule, or the party system. The truth is that democracy may take many forms and embrace many varieties of institution (it takes quite a different form in Britain from what it does in the U.S., for instance) and there may well develop an African or an Asian variety, in keeping with local traditions, which is just as worthy of the name 'democracy' as is the Westminster model.

Civil Liberties

But for a country to be democratic, certain conditions must be fulfilled—it is not enough for every man to have a vote, or even for opposition parties to be permitted. Without civil liberties—that is, the basic freedoms of speech, of association, of the person, of conscience—the elected representative of the people are powerless to act, no matter how 'democratically' they are elected, and the different interests in the community will not be heard or heeded. And without the rule of law, there can be no safeguard against the men in power taking more and more power unto themselves, acting arbitrarily as it suits their book, and eventually destroying completely the right to criticize and oppose.

If democracy were seen in this broader sense, the true choice which confronts the new nations would surely become clearer. The choice is not, as they now tend to see

it, between a strong determined government, pushing ahead successfully in rapidly raising living standards, and a group of (perhaps corrupt) politicians, grinding their own axes in some parliamentary talking-shop while progress hangs fire. The true choice is between, on the one hand, some form of dictatorship, which may or may not reap economic successes—it is by no means certain—but which will certainly mean the unhappy end of personal freedoms, even to the point of imprisonment without trial or condemnation to death by People's Courts against which there is no appeal (now to become a fact in Ghana). And, on the other hand, free, representative institutions, which may take divers forms as long as they respect the bases of freedom, and which also may, or may not, reap economic successes. It all depends on the determination of the government and the willingness of the people to co-operate. In other words, there is no guarantee of economic success, but true democracy is the only guarantee of personal liberty.

"Non-Aligned"—But

The trouble is that most Asians and Africans find it almost impossible to take this dispassionate view of the choice before them. The word 'democracy' has been sullied for them by its association with the Western powers who were, till so recently, their hated overlords. The democracies were the imperialists, the Communists the anti-imperialists. As anti-imperialism and the assertion of their independence are still the dominant emotions in the emergent countries, the Communist countries appear as friends, while the democracies are still suspect—if not outright enemies any longer. The emergent countries have had no experience of Communist 'colonialism' in Eastern Europe or in Tibet; they find Russia and China supporting their every complaint against the democratic west. Their bias will, almost inevitably, turn eastward. They will claim to be 'uncommitted' or 'non-aligned' but they cannot—not yet—rid themselves of this bias. Democracy, for them, has become identified with the abuses of democracy, of which there are still only too many; the professions of Communism, on the other hand, are taken at their face value.

The West thus finds itself faced with the utmost difficulty in its relations with Africa and Asia. And it has made, is still making, terrible mistakes. Perhaps the worst of these

mistakes has been the importation of our 'cold war' into the affairs of these continents. We may have thought it necessary to support any anti-communist régime, however unpopular and corrupt, as long as it was anti-communist. We may have induced certain of these countries into military alliances with us, against the popular will. We have supported—at the United Nations and elsewhere—some oppressive remaining imperialist régimes, because they are with us in NATO, and we have acted equivocally, to say the least, when certain actions by these régimes should have been condemned outright.

These gross errors have been underlined so often, that perhaps we are now learning. We have learnt that economic aid will bear no fruit in friendship if it is given as part of an anti-communist tactic, or if it is tied with political strings. We are beginning to learn that we dare not meddle in the internal affairs of any of these countries if we are to avoid a burning resentment—though that does not mean we dare not criticize, just as we criticize South Africa or Franco's Spain or Salazar's Portugal. We are even learning that we must keep our hands clean of dubious associations.

Confidence in Democracy

We have in fact learnt so much that we are now becoming timid, even in upholding our own beliefs. When Asians and Africans argue that only through some form of authoritarianism can they hope for speedy economic development, there are all too many voices in our own ranks who assent. We have no confidence that our way of life can deliver the goods. And if we have no confidence why should we expect others to have it? When they argue that democracy is unsuitable for their conditions, we nod (too many of us) in agreement, instead of pointing out that democracy may take many institutional forms but that its basic values are universal. By this lack of conviction on our part, we sell the pass. The Communists have no hesitation in proclaiming the universality of their creed, which in so many respects is anything but suitable for the type of agrarian economy still dominant in many of the new countries; but we are rendered impotent through hesitation.

One of our reasons for hesitation in criticizing even gross violations of democratic

values (as in Ghana today) is that we are weighted down by the worries of the cold war, and fearful of antagonizing the neutrals. But in countries like Ghana—and it is certainly true in almost all these countries—there are many who value democracy. There are many who are suffering bitterly under the oppression of dictatorial régimes, who have been prepared to endanger their freedom, and even their lives, in opposing it.

These people should be our best friends, but they feel they have been utterly betrayed when no democratic voice is raised in their defense. From where should they expect support, if we will not speak out? We betray our democratic ideals just as much by this rabbit-like timidity as we do when we condone Portugal's behavior in Angola, or South Africa's treatment of South-West Africa. And I simply do not believe that in this way we win anyone to our side. What is democracy worth, Asians and Africans are bound to think, if the democratic nations are not prepared to speak up in its behalf? Or do they really believe that democracy is only for them, that freedom means nothing to men of another color, that human rights are for people of white skins only? This is the invidious position in which we are landing ourselves.

We Westerners are the heirs of the proudest political systems, embodying the noblest political ideals in the world. But all will be lost, in the 'one world' of today, if we cannot recognize that these ideals should be the property of all men of all races, and that we cut the ground from beneath our feet if we do not insist that democracy can find its home in any and every soil.

**Remembering Angelo Zamparo
and what he stood for.**

LOUIS E. COVACICH

Jamaica, N.Y.

**County Central Committee,
SP-SDF For Democratic**

Socialism only.

Milwaukee, Wisc.

BERLIN: A KEY TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

Alex Garber

Many socialists—and others—may disagree with the assumptions and conclusions of Alex Garber's analysis of the Berlin crisis. It is offered as part of the continuing discussion of one of the crucial issues of our times.

DESPITE EXPLOSIVE potentials in the Congo, Laos, Cuba and Algeria, Berlin is the key to the international situation. Recent events once again highlight Berlin's political significance. They show how the city is linked to the fate of Germany as a whole, and how Germany in turn influences European affairs.

In August Khrushchev imprisoned over a million East Berliners. Three times in eight years the Soviets have inflamed war crises, each time by stamping out self-determination in an eastern satellite. The East Germans of 1953 like the revolutionary Hungarians of 1956 were crushed for their pursuit of national independence. The East Berliners of 1961 were asserting similar rights, but by means short of rebellion. They were exercising a freedom of movement guaranteed them twice over by four power agreement.

Since the end of the war, as the consequence of this guarantee, over 3.5 million East Germans escaped to the West mainly by way of Berlin. Early last August they fled at the rate of one every thirty seconds. East Germany, unlike any other modern industrial country, suffers an absolute population loss. Its 17.9 millions in 1948 fell to 16.2 millions by the end of 1958.

An age-group and occupation breakdown shows the loss to be doubly damaging. Refugees under 25 years of age comprised one half of the total, while those from 25 to 45 approximated another 25 percent. The flight of East German engineers and technicians since 1949 numbered about 25,000, a figure surpassed by fleeing school teachers during the same period. The flow of doctors and surgeons endangers East German medical care, so that one doctor is now available for approximately 1400 people. In West Germany there is one to every 750 inhabitants.

Even without wholesale migration, the free movement back and forth provoked instability in the East. Hannah Arendt said it a decade ago:

every bit of factual information that leaks through the iron curtain, set up against the ever threatening flood of reality from the other, non-totalitarian side, is a greater menace to totalitarian domination than counterpropaganda has been to totalitarian movements.

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West Berlin represented that threat, serving countless thousands of East Germans as their source of "information" and "reality." For example, West Berlin's annual agricultural exhibit in 1958, "Berlin Green Week," drew 145,000 eastern visitors, and another 196,000 attended the "German Industries Exhibition" in Berlin in 1958. The "Great Berlin Art Exhibition," the "International Book Exhibition," and the "7th German Mozart Festival" were among other 1958 events.

East German Difficulties

The effect upon the eastern system of controls was profound. In the last several years two waves of expulsion struck Ulbricht's SED party. First there was the "Harich conspiracy." This broke in the summer of 1956 when Wolfgang Harich, editor of a philosophical journal, instigated an East German intellectual revolt. He and his supporters saw new opportunities for German reunification (*Wiedervereinigung*) which could be enhanced by democratizing the politics, economics and culture of the East's regime. Harich's *Theses for Further Development of Marxism* acknowledged Trotsky, Bukharin, Rosa Luxemburg and even Karl Kautsky and Fritz Sternberg as contributors to Marxism. The expulsions and arrests could have been anticipated.

By early 1958 another dispute ended with the expulsion of three SED Central Committee members: Schirdewan, Wollwever, and Oelssner, and the suicide of Gerhard Ziller, secretary of the Central Committee. Ulbricht always upheld the sanctity of party ideology and policy, imposing them upon East Germans without regard for popular convictions. Schirdewan's group opposed this arbitrariness and insisted that the ideology of the party and consequently its policy fit social realities and mass acceptance.

Schirdewan's position entailed winning the population through open and free discussion. His department in the Central Committee made no objection to journeys into the West by Eastern residents. Ulbricht associated free discussion with a "counter-revolutionary attempt at overthrow." He favored strengthening the East rather than rapprochement and reunification. His particular demands for the confederation of the two Germanies presented at the party's 30th plenary session were, as the report of the

35th plenum showed, forced through against the votes of the Schirdewan group.

By mid-summer 1961, although no open opposition existed in the SED, the party retained its unpopularity and the regime its undiminished hostility. Accompanying that resentment, however, was a recognized powerlessness. The long arms of Soviet victories, reaching over the planet into outer space, had whipped the satellite peoples into resignation. Rebellions occur where there is hope of success. That hope in East Germany had fallen into despair. What did remain was sustained hope in Berlin. F. R. Alleman observed and reported on this two years ago in *Encounter*:

But they talk about Berlin. Will the road to Berlin—for them, when they need it, it is the escape route to the West—really be sealed off? That was the burning question. I found literally nobody, among old friends or new acquaintances, who failed to speak at once about this new anxiety . . . [they] think of West Berlin's cause as their own. It is difficult to imagine what they will feel if ever they had to take it as a 'lost cause.'

Soviet action on August 13 was more calculated and less precipitous than appeared at first. Craft marked the circumspect preparations. Careful distinctions were made between foreigners freely permitted access to East Berlin; West Berliners suspiciously scrutinized; and East Germans who were savagely repelled. The force of the Warsaw pact powers was utilized with the publication of their official approval. Marshall Koniiev, who commanded troops in Hungary in 1956, was put in charge of the Russian armed forces in East Germany.

The Russians Act

From previous occasions in which the Soviets menaced Eastern Europeans, Khrushchev learned that the Western powers would respond with pious protests alone. Liberating the satellites was a slogan the West invoked rarely and then only ritualistically. Years before, the State Department had ceased identifying U.S. self-interest with the national self-determination of Eastern and Central Europeans. Although freedom of movement for Berliners was included in the 1949 agreement, the U.S. showed an increasing distaste for its enforcement. At best the U.S. could be expected to dispatch token

troops to bolster the Berlin outpost; it could not be relied on to uphold political freedoms.

Soviet calculations proved to be accurate. Afterwards *The Economist* of London expressed surprise over the Soviet failure to plug the Berlin outlet months or even years before. When Khrushchev did move, the West voiced its expected protest and then conceded him East Berlin's hegemony. While the Vopo drove hundreds of irate East Germans from the Brandenburg Gate, West Berlin police pushed back Westerners also. It was as though an irresponsible populace were threatening peace by violating international solemnly determined borders. Responding to enraged West Berlin, Bonn suggested embargoing East Germany. No confirmation or encouragement came from Washington or London. So Adenauer withdrew before the Eastern threat to cut West Berlin's communications. Khrushchev needed no diversion; Kennedy himself side-stepped the East Berlin issue. The president was concerned with allied rights to Berlin's air corridors and land routes—from the West.

Khrushchev's Wall blocks off, at least for the present, West Berlin's political significance. But the city possesses a fundamental economic function insufficiently recognized abroad. Politically West Berlin faces east; economically it faces a west contributing bountifully to West Germany's economy.

With 2.2 million people West Berlin is the largest single urban center in Germany. Its gainfully employed number one million, whose purchasing power makes it the most flourishing market for West German products. In addition, West Berlin is the largest manufacturing city with the heaviest concentration of industrial workers in all Germany. More than two thousand of its firms export to over 135 countries.

However bright the story of the Federal Republic's return to the second ranking industrial position in the West with a rate exceeding the U.S.S.R., it fades before West Berlin's industrial growth. In 1950 the total turnover for the city's industry was \$450 million. After 1958 this approached \$2,000 million, a four hundred percent increase. Exports from West Berlin in 1950 amounted to \$25 million. By 1955 they rose nine hundred percent to almost \$225 million. An immense investment of domestic and foreign capital measured in billions of dollars achieved these results. The investment oc-

curred when West German surpluses were not syphoned into a military establishment.

West Berlin has become a prize economic jewel. It cannot be removed from the industrial complex of the Federal Republic without vast dislocations. Thus the control of the traffic corridors not only regulates the supply line to West Berlin, but it also permits a stranglehold on the city's productive contribution to West Germany.

Some Prospects Ahead

The threat of losing West Berlin economically confronts the Federal Republic with a difficult choice. The decision is not made easier by the surrender of West Berlin's political advantage. Nor is it facilitated by the continuous erosion of the West's position in Central Europe. From the 1948 *coup* in Czechoslovakia to the 1961 East Berlin annexation, the Soviet Union has succeeded in a piecemeal, but nonetheless relentless imperial expansion.

Keeping West Berlin out of the Soviet orbit involves Western military access to the city. This will be granted in return for an official recognition of Ulbricht's German Democratic Republic and its boundaries. But such a concession constitutes another political set-back. It means renouncing national self-determination by abandoning reunification. No political party in West Germany can repudiate reunification without hazarding its future; all are haunted by memories of the Treaty of Versailles. Even if East Germany is given legal recognition, who can guarantee that West Berlin will not be cut off economically? It is altogether possible for Western armed forces to have freedom of access, and impediments to the flow of economic goods out of Berlin can still be raised.

Can the Federal Republic absorb the loss of West Berlin and continue staffing NATO with more German manpower and military equipment? If this does occur, West Germany may truly become a garrison state, pushing for desperate military solutions. The prospect of a fully armed West Germany under the goad of the Western military is indeed grim.

Instead, will the West German Republic, succumbing to nationalist, reunification pressures, reject this westward military course and follow Berlin into a proximate relation with the Soviet bloc? This is more likely than appears on the surface. Numerous over-

tures have already been made to West Germany. Lothar Blotz, Ulbricht's foreign minister, has assured Western industrialists that neither his regime nor Moscow contemplate further nationalization of industry if the Germans were confederated. Khrushchev himself has conceded West Berliners their right to determine the character of their social and economic regime.

Some West German industrialists eagerly savor Khrushchev's offer of a limitless market in Europe and Asia. The present economic minister and likely future chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, in an interview several years ago with Paul Wohl of the *Christian Science Monitor* found rapprochement with the East relatively inoffensive. Should West Germany move into cordial affinity with the U. S. S. R. all of Western Europe would fall victim to this bloc. Its economic potential surpasses anything the world has seen to date.

Either prospect is a torment. One calls up the image of a West Germany, armed with nuclear weapons, the kingpin of NATO, seeking a military solution to its problems. The other envisages a confederated Germany yoked to an imperious totalitarianism by means of contributing German technology to Soviet manpower.

Inherent Danger—The Bomb

Surely there must be other answers to the Berlin crisis. Since Hiroshima socialist foreign policy has appropriately centered on the Bomb and the demand for immediate nuclear disarmament. As an extension of this, however, there is the tendency to see the Cold War in terms of the Weapon alone. Some go so far as to say that Bombs are the source rather than the reflection of military tensions as though war is a self-generating machine. This avoidance of the social determinants of conflict fails to define war as an instrument of policy. It disregards war as "a continuation of policy by other means." Foreign policy, to this extent, rests solely on the strategy of disarmament, and disarmament becomes the world's panacea. With this kind of commitment, moreover, disarmament, when lacking mutual agreement, is frequently advocated unilaterally.

Here is delusion. Disarmament by itself—even multilateral disarmament—will not wipe out nuclear weapons. Scientific knowledge cannot be swept under the carpet, nor is there a memory hole large enough to swallow the Bomb. Any nation with the tech-

nological potential can readily reconstruct nuclear weapons.

If democratic socialism won power over both sides of the iron curtain, war of a nuclear or less destructive form would be eliminated. This is the socialist promise and expectation, not because socialist governments eschew military force and especially nuclear weapons, but because socialism in power will change the character of international relations. Until such a revolutionary transformation socialists must proceed piecemeal and eradicate conditions that prompt all-out nuclear responses. Seeking to limit East-West conflict within prescribed regulations is a realistic socialist foreign policy. It is not to be confused with the pipedream of an East-West accommodation or the parousia of unilateralism.

What Is True?

Unilateralists insinuate that the West's abandonment of the Bomb will undermine the Soviet annihilative stand. This applies more fully, they indicate, to the West's relinquishing all armaments. Nothing reveals the mystique of exemplary action more clearly. Not that exemplary action is to be overlooked in personal relations, but the mystique consists in psychologizing international relations and in trying to build a foreign policy around a psychological presumption.

Does disarming a nation or a community in itself change Soviet enmity toward it? Since 1945 East Germany never possessed arms except with Soviet approval, nor did it threaten Soviet dominance except in the remotest sense. Yet the Soviets coerced the East German population to the point of brutal imprisonment. Without fear of retaliation from the West the Soviets would doubtlessly have annexed East Berlin sooner and perhaps West Berlin as well. The barbarity of Soviet action lies in its annihilative approach even to peaceful expressions of political choice.

To be preoccupied with the Weapon, as is the unilateralist, tends to substitute a moral stance for political analysis. At best disarmament proposals address only the peaceful aspirations of the world. There are also entreaties for liberation from oppressors, desires for modernizing backward countries, and grievances against alienation and rootlessness. Disarmament thus is a single issue answer in a much bedeviled world whose multiple problems require careful investi-

gation and responsible solutions. It is at this juncture that a socialist ethic appears and shuns a morality based on absolute ends. Precisely because it seeks to relate itself to human beings and their problems in this world, democratic socialism functions with an ethic of responsibility by which it must account for the foreseeable results of its action. Given this viewpoint, what answers do socialists offer in the Berlin crisis?

Alternatives Possible

Whatever other alternatives are available for Germany must be seen within the framework of nuclear deterrence. That such a deterrence exists has been evident since the Korean War when both sides applied privileged sanctuary and accepted limited objectives. If there were no nuclear deterrence, that is, if the Soviets intend to escalate any conflict to absolute annihilation, then, of course, the only alternatives are surrender or all-out nuclear war. But deterrence is a fact of international life, and other alternatives are possible. Two of these are presented as mutually interdependent propositions for the solution of the Berlin crisis.

Instead of a de jure recognition of East Germany and the Oder-Neisse Line, the West should reaffirm national self-determination for all peoples including the Germans.

The West must insure a demilitarized Germany constituted on the basis of national self-determination.

All sides can benefit from the establishment of a disarmed and reunified Germany. The Germans gain national sovereignty without military adventures. The Soviets through a neutralization of Germany receive guarantees against military provocations regardless of German economic growth. The U. S. redeems its claim as representative of the Free West by invoking democratic principles for a beleaguered people. Moreover, such a negotiated peace can lay the groundwork for the demilitarization of all Europe and perhaps universal disarmament itself.

But what if Khrushchev spurns the request for this kind of negotiated agreement? In that case the West falls back to the call for national self-determination among all the satellite peoples and offers material and military aid to any popular rebellion showing promise of success. The vulnerability of totalitarianism lies in its hostile subjects whose organization and possible rebellion are communism's greatest fear. Furthering

the inner contradictions of totalitarianism leads to its weakening and its resultant liberalization. Soviet liberalization makes compromise possible, because compromise is the product of contradictions. Those who think otherwise read history backwards. If such alternatives are not put into operation, the West faces the step-for-step consequences of Khrushchev's strategy.

GREETINGS FROM:

Greetings from

Ruth and Bernie Englander

Croton on the Hudson, New York

7th Ward Branch SP-SDF

has charter signed

Eugene V. Debs, 1897.

Milwaukee, Wisc.

**Emil Brodde, Member,
Carpenters Union No. 1053.
Member, Office Employees
Union No. 9.**

Milwaukee, Wisc.

**Thanks. All workers need unions.
CHARLES DAVIS, Member,
Federation of Union Representatives.**

**Erma Arnstein
San Francisco, California**

**Nat Hillson
Pasadena, California**

THE PSYCHOSIS OF POVERTY IN AMERICA

We shall probably discover that the poor are even less ready to part with their neuroses than the rich, because the third life that awaits them when they recover has no attraction, and illness in them gives them more claim to the help of others.

—SIGMUND FREUD

THERE ARE few people in the United States who accept Rousseau's image of the "noble savage," of primitive, untutored man as being more natural than, and superior to, his civilized descendants. Such an idea could hardly survive in a society that has made technological progress one of its most central values. There are occasional daydreams about "getting away from it all," of going to an idyllic countryside, but these are usually passing fancies.

Yet, there is a really important remnant of Rousseau's myth. It is the conviction that, as emotional disturbances and mental disease go, the poor are noble savages and the rich are the prime victims of tension and conflict.

There are the literature of the harried executive, the tales of suburban neurosis, the theme of the danger of wealth and leisure.

Michael Harrington

It is not so much that anyone says that the poor are healthy in spirit because they are deprived of material things. Rather, the poor are just forgotten, as usual. The novels and the popular sociology are written by the middle class about the middle class, and there is more than a little strain of self-pity. The result is an image in which personal maladjustment flourishes at the top of the society, the price the well-off pay for their power. As you go down the income scale, this theory implies, life becomes more tedious and humdrum, if less upset. (However, it should be noted that the white-collar strata have the chronicler of their quiet desperation in Paddy Chayevsky.)

The truth is almost exactly opposite of the myth. The poor are subject to more mental illness than anyone in the society, and their disturbances tend to be more than those of any other class. This conclusion has emerged from a series of studies made over the past few decades. There is still consid-

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erable controversy and disagreement with regard to the reasons behind this situation. But the fact itself would seem to be beyond dispute.

Indeed, if there is any point in American society where one can see poverty as a culture, as a way of life, it is here. There is, in a sense, a personality of poverty, a type of human being produced by the grinding, wearing life of the slums. The other Americans feel differently than the rest of the nation. They tend to be hopeless and passive, yet prone to bursts of violence; they are lonely and isolated, often rigid and hostile. To be poor is not simply to be deprived of the material things of this world. It is to enter a fatal, futile universe, an America within America with a twisted spirit.

The Description of an Abyss

Perhaps the most classic (but still controversial) study of this subject is the book *Social Class and Mental Illness* by August B. Hollingshead and F. C. Redlich. Published in 1958, it summarizes a careful research project in New Haven, Connecticut.

Hollingshead and Redlich divided New Haven into five social classes. At the top (Class I) were the rich, usually aristocrats of family as well as of money. Next came the executives and professionals more newly arrived to prestige and power. Then, the middle class, and beneath them, the workers with decent-paying jobs. Class V, the bottom class, was made up of the poor. About half unskilled. The men had less than six years of education, the women less than eight.

As it turned out, this five-level breakdown was more revealing than the usual three-class image of American society (upper, middle, and lower). For it showed a sharp break between Class V at the bottom and Class IV just above it. In a dramatic psychological sense, the skilled unionized worker lived much, much closer to the middle class than he did to the world of the poor. Between Class IV and Class V, Hollingshead and Redlich found a chasm. This represents the gulf between working America, which may be up against it from time to time but which has a certain sense of security and dignity, and the other America of the poor.

Perhaps the most shocking and decisive statistic that Hollingshead and Redlich found was the one that tabulated the rate

of treated psychiatric illness per 100,000 people in New Haven. These are the results:

Classes I and II	556 per 100,000
Class III	538
Class IV	642
Class V	1,659

From the top of society down to the organized workers, there are differences, but relatively small ones. But suddenly, when one crosses the line from Class IV to Class V, there is a huge leap, with the poor showing a rate of treated psychiatric illness of almost three times the magnitude of any other class.

But the mental suffering of the poor in these figures is not simply expressed in gross numbers. It is a matter of quality as well. In Classes I and II, 65 per cent of the treated psychiatric illness is for neurotic problems, and only 35 per cent for the much graver disturbances of psychoses. But at the bottom, in Class V, 90 per cent of the treated illness is for psychosis, and only 10 per cent for neurosis. In short, not only the rate but also the intensity of mental illness is much greater for the poor.

The Neurotic Poor

One of the standard professional criticisms of Hollingshead and Redlich is that their figures are for treated illness (those who actually got to a doctor or clinic) and do not indicate the "true prevalence" of mental illness in the population. Whatever merits this argument has in relation to other parts of the study, it points up that these particular figures are an understatement of the problem. The higher up the class scale one is, the more likely that there will be recognition of mental illness as a problem and that help will be sought. At the bottom of society, referral to psychiatric treatment usually comes from the courts. Thus, if anything, there is even more mental illness among the poor than the figures of Hollingshead and Redlich indicate.

The one place where this criticism might have some validity is with regard to the intensity of emotional disturbance. Only 10 per cent of the poor who received treatment are neurotics, yet the poor neurotic is the least likely person in the society to show up for treatment. He can function, if only in an impaired and maimed way. If there were something done about this situation, it

is quite possible that one would find more neurosis in the other America at the same time as one discovered more mental illness generally.

However, it is not necessary to juggle with statistics and explanations in order to corroborate the main drift of the New Haven figures. During the fifties the Cornell University Department of Psychiatry undertook an ambitious study of "Midtown," a residential area in New York City. The research dealt with a population of 170,000 from every social class, 99 per cent of them white. (By leaving out the Negroes, there probably was a tendency to underestimate the problem of poverty generally, and the particular disabilities of a discriminated minority in particular.) The goal of the study was to discover "true prevalence," and there was interviewing in depth.

The Cornell scholars developed a measure of "mental health risk." They used a model of three classes, and consequently their figures are not so dramatic as those tabulated in New Haven. Yet they bear out the essential point: the lowest class had a mental health risk of almost 40 per cent greater than the highest class. Once again the world of poverty was given definition as a spiritual and emotional reality.

Stress Factors

The huge brute fact of emotional illness in the other America is fairly well substantiated. The reasons behind the fact are the subject of considerable controversy. There is no neat and simple summary that can be given at the present time, yet some of the analyses are provocative for an understanding of the culture of poverty even if they must be taken tentatively.

One of the most interesting speculations came from the Cornell study of "Midtown" in New York City. The researchers developed a series of "stress factors" that might be related to an individual's mental health risk. In childhood, these were poor mental health on the part of the parents, poor physical health for the parents, economic deprivation, broken homes, a negative attitude on the part of the child toward his parents, a quarrelsome home, and sharp disagreements with parents during adolescence. In adult life, the stress factors were poor health, work worries, money worries, a lack of neighbors and friends, marital worries, and parental worries.

The Cornell team then tested to see if there was any relationship between these factors and mental health. They discovered a marked correlation. The person who had been subjected to thirteen of these stress factors was three times more likely to be mentally disturbed than the person who had felt none of them. Indeed, the researchers were led to conclude that the sheer number of stress factors was more important than the quality of stresses. Those who had experienced any three factors were of a higher mental risk than those who had experienced two.

If the Cornell conclusions are validated in further research, they will constitute an important revision of some widely held ideas about mental health. The Freudian theory has emphasized the earliest years and the decisive trauma in the development of mental illness (for example, the death of a parent). This new theory would suggest a more cumulative conception of mental illness: as stress piles upon stress over a period of time, there is a greater tendency toward disturbance. It would be an important supplement to the Freudian ideas.

But if this theory is right, there is a fairly obvious reason for the emotional torment of the other America. The stress factors listed by the Cornell study are the very stuff of the life of the poor; physical illness, broken homes, worries about work and money, and all the rest. The slum, with its vibrant, dense life hammers away at the individual. And because of the sheer, grinding, dirty experience of being poor, the personality, the spirit, is impaired. It is as if human beings dilapidate along with the tenements in which they live.

No "Drift" Downwards

However, some scholars have attempted to soften the grimness of this picture with a theory about "drift." The poor, they argue, have a high percentage of disturbed people, not because of the conditions of life in the urban and rural slums, but because this is the group that gets all the outcasts of society from the rest of the classes. If this thesis were true, then one would expect to find failures from the higher classes as a significant group in the culture of the poor.

Hollingshead and Redlich tested this theory in New Haven and did not find any confirmation for it. The mentally impaired poor had been, for the most part, born

poor. Their sickness was a product of poverty, instead of their poverty being a product of sickness. Similarly, in the Midtown study, no evidence was turned up to indicate that the disturbed poor were the rejects from other classes. There are some exceptions to this rule: alcoholics, as noted before, often tend to fall from high position into the bitterest poverty. Still, current research points to a direct relationship between the experience of poverty and emotional disturbance.

And yet, an ironic point turned up in the Midtown research. It was discovered that a certain kind of neurosis was useful to a minority of poor people. The obsessive-compulsive neurotic often got ahead: his very sickness was a means of advancement out of the other America and into the great world. And yet, this might only prepare for a later crisis. On the lower and middle rungs of business society, hard work, attention to detail, and the like are enough to guarantee individual progress. But if such a person moves across the line, and is placed in a position where he must make decisions, there is the very real possibility of breakdown.

I

Someone in trouble, someone in sorrow, a fight between neighbors, a coffin carried from a house, were things that colored their lives and shook down fiery blossoms where they walked.

—SEAN O'CASEY

The feelings, the emotions, the attitudes of the poor are different. But different from what? In this question there is an important problem of dealing with the chaotic in the world of poverty.

The definition makers, the social scientists, and the moralists come from the middle class. Their values do not include "a fight between neighbors" as a "fiery blossom." Yet that is the fact in the other America. (O'Casey was talking about Ireland; he might as well have been describing any slum in the United States.) Before going on and exploring the emotional torment of the poor, it would be well to understand this point.

Take the gangs. They are violent, and by middle-class standards they are antisocial and disturbed. But within a slum, violence and disturbance are often norms, everyday facts of life. From the inside of the other America, joining a "bopping" gang may well

not seem like deviant behavior. It could be a necessity for dealing with a hostile world. (Once, in a slum school in St. Louis, a teacher stopped a fight between two little girls. "Nice girls don't fight," she told them. "Yeah," one of them replied, "you should have seen my old lady at the tavern last night.")

The Failure to Relate

Indeed, one of the most depressing pieces of research I have ever read touches on this point. H. Warren Dunham carefully studied forty catatonic schizophrenics in Chicago in the early forties. He found that none of them had belonged to gangs or had engaged in the kind of activity the middle class regards as abnormal. They had, as a matter of fact, tried to live up to the standards of the larger society, rather than conforming to the values of the slum. "The catatonic young man can be described as a good boy and one who has all the desirable traits which all the social agencies would like to inculcate in the young men of the community."

The middle class does not understand the narrowness of its judgments. And worse, it acts upon them as if they were universal and accepted by everyone. In New Haven, Hollingshead and Redlich found two girls with an almost identical problem. Both of them were extremely promiscuous, so much so that they eventually had a run-in with the police. When the girl from Class I was arrested, she was provided with bail, at once, newspaper stories were quashed, and she was taken care of through private psychotherapy. The girl from Class V was sentenced to reform school. She was paroled in two years, but was soon arrested again and sent to the state reformatory.

James Baldwin made a brilliant and perceptive application of this point to the problem of the Negro in a speech I heard not long ago. The white, he said, cannot imagine what it is like to be Negro: the danger, the lack of horizon, the necessity of always being on guard and watching. For that matter, Baldwin went on, the Negro problem is really the white problem. It is not the Negro who sets dark skin and kinky hair aside as something fearful, but the white. And the resolution of the racial agony in America requires a deep introspection on the part of the whites. They must discover themselves even more than the Negro.

This is true of all the juvenile delinquents, all the disturbed people, in the other America. One can put it baldly: their sickness is often a means of relating to a diseased environment. Until this is understood, the emotionally disturbed poor person will probably go on hurting himself until he becomes a police case. When he is finally given treatment, it will be at public expense, and it will be inferior to that given the rich. (In New Haven, according to Hollingshead and Redlich, the poor are five times more likely to get organic therapy—including shock treatment—rather than protracted, individual professional care.)

Trapped by Fate?

For that matter, some of the researchers in the field believe that sheer ignorance is one of the main causes of the high rate of disturbance among the poor. In the slum, conduct that would shock a middle-class neighborhood and lead to treatment is often considered normal. Even if someone is constantly and violently drunk, or beats his wife brutally, people will say of such a person, "Well, he's a little odd." Higher up on the class scale an individual with such a problem would probably realize that something was wrong (or his family would). He will have the knowledge and the money to get help.

One of the researchers in the field who puts great stress on the "basic universals" of the Freudian pattern (mother figure, father figure, siblings) looks upon this factor of ignorance as crucial. He is Dr. Lawrence Kubie. For Dr. Kubie, the fundamental determinants of mental health and illness are the same in every social class. But culture and income and education account for whether the individual will handle his problem; whether he understands himself as sick; whether he seeks help, and so on. This theory leaves the basic assumptions of traditional psychoanalysis intact, but, like any attempt to deal with the poor, it recognizes that something is different.

For the rich, then, and perhaps even for the better-paid worker, breakdowns, neurosis, and psychosis appear as illness and are increasingly treated as such. But the poor do not simply suffer these disturbances; they suffer them blindly. To them it does not appear that they are mentally sick; to them it appears that they are trapped in a fate. . . .

II

Out of all this, the research more and more suggests, there emerges the personality of poverty, the "typical citizen" of the other America.

This is how the Midtown researchers described the "low social economic status individual": they are "rigid, suspicious and have a fatalistic outlook on life. They do not plan ahead, a characteristic associated with their fatalism. They are prone to depression, have feelings of futility, lack of belongingness, friendliness, and a lack of trust in others." Translated into the statistics of the Midtown study, this means that the bottom of the society is three times more emotionally depressed than the top (36.2 per cent for the low, 11.1 per cent for the high).

A small point: America has a self-image of itself as a nation of joiners and doers. There are social clubs, charities, community drives, and the like. Churches have always played an important social role, often marking off the status of individuals. And yet this entire structure is a phenomenon of the middle class. Some time ago, a study in Franklin, Indiana, reported that the percentage of people in the bottom class who were without affiliation of any kind was eight times as great as the percentage in the high-income class.

The Lonely Life of the Poor

Paradoxically, one of the factors that intensifies the social isolation of the poor is that America thinks of itself as a nation without social classes. As a result, there are few social or civic organizations that are separated on the basis of income and class. The "working-class culture" that sociologists have described in a country like England does not exist here, or at least it is much less of a reality. The poor person who might want to join an organization is afraid. Because he or she will have less education, less money, less competence to articulate than anyone else in the group, he stays away.

Thus, studies of civilian-defense organizations during World War II showed that almost all the members were white-collar people. Indeed, though one might think that the poor would have more friends because they are packed densely together, there are studies that indicate that they are deprived

in this regard, too. In one report, 47 per cent of the lower-class women said that they had no friend or no intimate friend.

The Fatalism of the Poor

Such a life is lonely; it is also insecure. In New Haven, Hollingshead and Redlich could find only 19 per cent of the people in the bottom class who thought that their jobs were safe. The Yale group described 45 per cent of the poor as "inured," and found that their motto was "We take what the tide brings in."

This fatalism is not, however, confined to personal experience alone, to expectations about job and family. It literally permeates every aspect of an individual's life; it is a way of seeing reality. In a poll the Gallup organization did for *Look* magazine in 1959 (a projection of what people anticipated in the sixties), the relationship between social class and political pessimism was striking. The bottom group was much more likely to think that World War III was coming, that a recession was around the corner, that they would not take a vacation in the coming year. As one went up the income scale, the opinion of the world tended to brighten.

This pessimism is involved in a basic attitude of the poor: the fact that they do not postpone satisfactions, that they do not save. When pleasure is available, they tend to take it immediately. The smug theorist of the middle class would probably deplore this as showing a lack of traditional American virtues. Actually, it is the logical and natural pattern of behavior for one living in a part of American life without a future. It is, sad to say, a piece of realism, not of vice.

Related to this pattern of immediate gratification is a tendency on the part of the poor to "act out," to be less inhibited, and sometimes violent. There are some superficial observers who give this aspect of slum life a Rousseauistic twist. They find it a proof of the vitality, of the naturalness of the poor who are not constrained by the conventions of polite society. It would be hard to imagine a more wrongheaded impression. In the first place, this violence is the creature of that most artificial environment, the slum. It is a product of human density and misery. And far from being an aspect of personality that is symptomatic of health, it is one more way in which the poor are driven to hurt themselves.

If one turns to the family life of the other America, there is an almost summary case of the dislocation and strains at the bottom of society.

In New Haven, for instance, Hollingshead and Redlich found that in Class V (the poor) some 41 per cent of the children under seventeen lived in homes that had been disrupted by death, desertion, separation, or divorce. This, of course, has profound consequences for the personalities of the young people involved. (This would be an instance in which the traditional Freudian account of mental illness would be relevant to the other America. An unstable family structure, with a father or mother figure absent, would predict devastating personal consequences.)

Then, the types of family structure the Yale researchers found among the poor are important. Some 44 per cent of the children lived in "nuclear families," which unite father, mother, and children. But 23 per cent grew up in a "generation stem family," where different generations are thrown together, usually with a broken marriage or two. Under such circumstances there is the possibility of endless domestic conflict between the different generations (and this is exacerbated when the old people are immigrants with a foreign code). Another 18 per cent came from broken homes where one or the other parent was absent. And 11 per cent had experienced the death of a parent.

Another aspect of this family pattern is sexual. In New Haven the researchers found that it was fairly common for young girls in the slums to be pregnant before they are married. I saw a similar pattern in St. Louis. There, children had a sort of sophisticated ignorance about sexual matters at an early age. Jammed together in miserable housing, they knew the facts of sex from first-hand observation (though often what they saw was a brutalized and drunken form of sex). In this sense, they were much more sophisticated than the children in middle-class neighborhoods.

But the poor are never that really well informed. As noted before, along with a cynical version of the facts of life there went an enormous amount of misinformation. For instance, young girls were given systematic miseducation on the menstrual period. They were often frightened and guilt-ridden about sex at the same time that they were sophisticated.

And finally, the family of the poor lives

cheek and jowl with other families of the poor. The sounds of all the quarreling and fights of every other family are always present if there happens to be a moment of peace in one household. The radio and the television choices of the rest of the block are regularly in evidence. Life is lived in common, but not in community.

Delinquency Begins at Home

So it is that the adolescents roam the streets. For the young, there is no reason to stay around the house. The street is a moment of relief, relaxation, and excitement. The family, which should be a bulwark against the sheer physical misery of the poor, is overwhelmed by the environment.

In this context, some of the rhetorical pieties of this society take on an unwitting irony. For example, here is Mayor Wagner of New York discussing the role of the promiscuous, addicted, violent girls in the gang wars of his city: "Of course, he continued, the ultimate prevention of delinquency must begin in the home. Nothing the government of the community can do, he said, will substitute for the reassertion of parental control."

The only trouble with this familiar formula is that delinquency begins in the home and that these girls are, in all probability, fleeing a domestic shambles. To wait around until parental authority reasserts itself under the present conditions is to wait forever. The government and the community must first make it possible for there to be a "home" in the deepest sense of the word. But that, of course, means massive action against the culture of poverty in the other America.

Poverty is expensive to maintain.

The tensions, the chaos, the dislocations described in this chapter are a major item in the budget of every municipality. In some cities a quarter of the annual funds are devoted to taking care of the special fire, police, and health problems created by the slums. The cost of keeping these people at the bottom year in and year out (rather than making an investment in real change once for all) is considerable.

Another aspect of the high cost of poverty was computed a few years ago by Ernest M. Gruenberg and Seymour S. Ballin. They estimated that there were 9,000,000 people in the United States "suffering from a wide range of diagnosable disorders." (The disorders referred to were emotional and men-

tal.) Of these, 1,500,000 were hospital cases (but only half that number were in hospitals at a given time). These figures did not include the 1,500,000 who were mentally retarded.

In these statistics, one out of every sixteen persons in the United States was living an impaired life because of emotional disturbances. Gruenberg and Ballin suggest that mental illness of this magnitude causes the loss of a billion dollars in wages every year. And they compute the Government expenditures in dealing with the problem at a little over a billion dollars. (This does not count the money spent by private agencies.) Thus, the immediate cost of these illnesses is over two billion dollars.

A major component of this enormous loss is provided by the other America. And, as noted before, their torment is a form of realism.

The emotional turmoil of the poor is, as Freud intimates in the quotation prefacing this chapter, a form of protection against the turmoil of the society, a way of getting some attention and care in an uncaring world. Given this kind of "defense," it requires an enormous effort for these people to cross over into the great society.

Indeed, emotional upset is one of the main forms of the vicious circle of impoverishment. The structure of the society is hostile to these people: they do not have the right education or the right jobs, or perhaps there are no jobs to be had at all. Because of this, in a realistic adaptation to a socially perverse situation, the poor tend to become pessimistic and depressed; they seek immediate gratification instead of saving; they act out.

Once this mood, this unarticulated philosophy becomes a fact, society can change, the recession can end, and yet there is no motive for movement. The depression has become internalized. The middle class looks upon this process and sees "lazy" people who "just don't want to get ahead." People who are much too sensitive to demand of cripples that they run races ask of the poor that they get up and act just like everyone else in the society.

The poor are not like everyone else. They are a different kind of people. They think and feel differently; they look upon a different America than the middle class looks upon. They, and not the quietly desperate clerk or harried executive, are the main victim of this society's tension and conflict.

LABOR'S NEW FRONTIER:

WHITE COLLAR UNIONISM

New York Teachers Show The Way

Herman Benson

CAN UNIONISM survive intact the transformation of the working class from a blue collar to a white collar majority? The question is raised with a sense of increasing alarm among union staff intellectuals where the discussion has become almost a fad. New York public school teachers point to a reply; 10,000 of the city classroom teachers have already joined the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2 of the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO.

Back in 1948, President Philip Murray told the CIO's tenth convention that the progress of white collar unionism "is not sufficient after eleven years of organizational activity." He called for a "realistic, practical, constructive solution of those organizational problems." In the twenty-three years that followed, results were disappointing. Yet the task became more urgent.

Between 1956-1958, reversing the trend of twenty years, dues paying union member-

ship declined. Meanwhile, the composition of the work force was transformed. From the vantage point of over half a century, the trend is startling. In 1900, white collar workers made up 17.8% of the work force and manual workers were twice as numerous with 35.8%. By 1959, the balance had shifted: white collar workers with 42.4% outnumbered blue collars with 36.9%. Meanwhile, workers in the so-called service industries rose from 6% in 1900 to 10% in 1950, to 12% in 1960. Most dramatic in the last decade was the decline in the proportion of blue collar workers from 41% to 37%.

In manufacturing, stronghold of modern industrial unionism, the percentage of production and maintenance workers dropped from 72.7% in 1952 to 67.8% in 1960 while white collar jobs rose from 20% to 25%. The New employees were professionals, not clerks. Engineers and technicians were coming in to design and regulate the controls of automated mass production. In the chemicals and aircraft industries, almost 40% of the employees are white collar. The process penetrates deepest in expanding sectors of

This article was typeset before the collective bargaining election for teachers was conducted by New York City's Labor Department. Of 43,500 teachers eligible to vote, some 33,000 cast a ballot, or 77 per cent. The United Federation of Teachers won a smashing victory, with 20,045 votes. The impact of this event on teachers throughout the country can hardly be overestimated.—The Editors.

HERMAN BENSON is the editor of *Union Democracy in Action*. His articles on labor topics have appeared recently in *The Progressive*, *New America* and *Labor History*.

industry: the more modern the factory, the greater the instrumentation, the more important the engineer and technician. The Officers' Report to the 1960 Machinists' convention speaks of "the monumental shift from blue collar to white collar occupations. For example, at Boeing the ratio of white collar workers to blue collar workers has changed within the past 15 years from approximately 3-1 in favor of blue collar workers to 3-2 in favor of white collar workers."

Crisis or Opportunity?

Elementary arithmetic should worry any contemplative labor official who bothers to add. Unless unions enroll this rising stratum, they will sink to a minority within a new working class, reverting to the position, in that respect, of 1923-35. With the rise of the CIO, a modern labor movement came forward as a broad social movement. "We are the vanguard in America, the architects of the future," says Walter Reuther. This emblazoned watchword aimed not simply at small gains for dues-payers but at sweeping advances in the social position and democratic rights of all. But if organized labor cannot appeal successfully to new millions of employees, can it claim, with justification, to speak for the people? If not, the public will inevitably see in unionism, rightly or wrongly, a narrow self-interest group. Labor, then faces a crisis not merely of numerical strength but of basic moral position.

But the swift rise of teacher-unionism shows that there is also a grand opportunity. For the cold statistics have another meaning which has been overlooked.

Compared to the white collar force, the blue collar has declined. *But in the labor force as a whole, the blue collar sector has substantially retained its position over sixty years.* This simple fact is of crucial significance. It means, in substance, that white collar jobs in the economy as a whole have risen not by forcing down the number of blue collar jobs but at the expense, so to speak, of other sections of the labor force. While attention is focused on the relative position of white collar-blue collar, a simultaneous trend in the labor force is forgotten: the decline of farm labor from 37.5% in 199 to 11.8% in 1950; to 8.5% in 1959. Farmers, or their children, move into the cities and take jobs in factories. The children of factory workers, already wise in the

ways of the city, move into offices and professions. The urban working class, the number of *employees* taken as a whole, blue collar and white collar leaps upward as millions move massively from farm to city. But that is not all. In two generations, the social position of the industrial working class rose from an oppressed, sometimes degraded, vastly ignorant section of the population to fuller citizenship, with rights, education, free time, and a dignity it never possessed, organized into an effective political force. Now, this blue collar working class, already organized into strong unions, gains direct access in the cities to a new layer of the population, to new hired employees with white collars. That is the opportunity.

By organizing mass production workers in the thirties, the labor movement did more than solidify itself; it profoundly affected national life as it rose from a marginal and insecure position to a potent and permanent social and political factor. It became a people's movement. For a generation, it gave meaning to American democracy and a mass base to it and helped preserve the gains of the New Deal. When the way was blocked in government, it wrested social advances through its own sheer massed industrial power in strikes and in bargaining.

But since the late thirties, when the New Deal petered out, the nation's political life has been stalemated. Not one new piece of major social legislation has been adopted since Congress came under control of a conservative coalition of right-wing Republicans and Southern Democrats. Now come the first big signs of a changing mood. The nationwide civil rights movement and the thrust of the Southern Negro for equal rights offer the first opportunity for a new advance of liberalism by undermining the power of Southern reaction right at home. If the labor movement, as in the thirties, could enroll the new millions a new phase in social liberalism would be before us. If! Is it possible? Or is unionism "natural" only for production workers?

White Collar Foothold

White collar unionism has already won a strong foothold. Relax for your 600-miles an hour jet flight and admire America's sweetheart, the charming young hostess who is expected to enjoy glamor as a substitute for pay. But she doesn't like the idea and that is why she is a member of the Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Association.

Thousands of other young women are organized telephone operators. There are the skilled professionals: masters, mates, marine engineers, radio operators, airline pilots and flight engineers. There are the entertainers: musicians, actors, screen writers. There are clerks: post office workers, railway clerks. And salesmen, pharmacists, insurance agents. And recently even doctors who work as city employees. Unionism obviously can be attractive to white collar workers.

A greater proportion of the white collar work force has already been organized than the proportion of the blue collar work force organized in 1935. In 1948, estimates C. Wright Mills, 16.2% of white collar workers were organized. But back in 1935, before the CIO, only 12.1% of the blue collar force was in unions! From the standpoint of elemental organization, white collar unionism is in a far more advantageous position than the general unionism of the early thirties. Only a few years before the great revival, unionism was literally bankrupt; among miners and clothing workers, unionism existed only in skeleton forms. Now as it faces unorganized white collar millions, the labor movement is powerful and even rich. With the immediate families of its members, unionism is linked to nearly a third of the nation's population. It is not merely strong in industry; it has been a potent factor in politics for 25 years.

In the thirties, a frail labor movement was backed by nothing but liberal public opinion and its own meager resources. In the sixties, the organized white collar force outnumbered the whole labor movement of the thirties and is backed by the power of millions of other organized unionists. Why, with all these advantages, does the job of extending white collar unionism seem so formidable? It is not a puzzle in white collar mentality but a problem in what is loosely called "public opinion."

Unions Alienated from Intellectuals

In the thirties, unionism could count on the widespread conviction among fair-minded persons that labor was on the side of justice. In an earlier generation, sit-in strikers might have been shot or jailed and the act sanctified as a righteous defense of untrammelled private property. But in the mood of the mid-thirties, such repression was unthinkable except as a recognized crime against social progress like Memorial Day in Chicago. Now unionism can defend

itself; but the sustaining public opinion has become skeptical.

Harry Van Arsdale, President of New York's Central Labor Council, told Columbia teachers, "Today with the exception of these intellectuals who specialize in labor-management relations, the intellectual force in America feels as alienated from the labor movement as the labor movement feels alienated from the intellectuals." One professor wrote in *Labor History* last year, "the political prestige of organized labor stands at its lowest level in thirty years."

The stability of our labor movement is now founded upon the deep loyalty of its own organized millions. But other millions, outside its orbit, are in quite a different frame of mind, among them the unorganized white collar workers. Bringing them in to unions is one phase of the job of transforming public opinion.

It may seem simple enough to account for the estrangement of public opinion. There is corruption and violation of democracy; there is Jim Crow and narrow selfishness. Granted, it is only part of the story and can be misleading in its one-sidedness. But it is there and will not be whisked away. Yet, it is not that simple.

Changes Since the Thirties

There is more democracy in the labor movement today than in the early thirties because there are many more unions that are democratic. In proportion to size, there is less corruption; not because crookedness has been eliminated but because the decent sector of labor has grown; the U.A.W., the Rubber Workers, the Oil Workers, the IUE just weren't there before. Regarded without illusions, the union movement before the CIO was less democratic, more corrupted, more bigoted, less conscious of social responsibility than today. Nevertheless, unionism as an ideal, a program, and a movement aroused moral support. For many radicals and intellectuals, labor seemed freedom's hope and mankind's potential liberator. There was no contradiction. For if in its majority the labor movement was backward and uninspiring, there was within it or around it a crusading minority of democrats, socialists, and idealists who called vociferously for its transformation. Often, without aid from official labor, these social radicals went on to organize and they were soon vindicated by the rising CIO, the expectation of a new labor movement, demo-

cratic and militant. Whatever its faults, unionism seemed about to renew itself.

That looming promise of change has vanished. Good and bad alike, corrupt and honest, democratic and arbitrary, the labor movement is bogged down. It is no longer on the march and no one seriously presses for change, much less promises it. Prospects for white collar organization would be gloomy except that unionism possesses a deep social appeal despite its impasse, almost despite itself.

The Organization of the Teachers

For now, unexpectedly and without particular stimulus from the labor movement, New York City's teachers are becoming unionists. Of 40,000 classroom teachers, 10,000 have already signed up with the United Federation of Teachers. In the process, they are restoring some of the qualities of the militant minority of an earlier day. They are educated and their leaders are democratic-minded young men and women. In campaigning for recognition and collective bargaining rights, they can have an important effect on the nation's 1,000,000 teachers, most immediately upon those in the big cities. Here is a key to white collar public opinion.

In a study "White Collar Unionization" in 1949, the National Industrial Conference Board reported a device used successfully by one union. "Occasionally a sympathetic radio celebrity would lend his apartment for a meeting and he himself would appear there to attract the white collar employees." In another instance, "Because many of the employees were movie-conscious young women, the [union] added this glamour note, 'Robert Montgomery, President of the Screen Actors Guild, says, 'I can assure you that the actors have had no doubt of the necessity [of unionism]!'"

It was lucky to find a few obliging union celebrities. But what a movie star did in a small way, teachers can do on a grand scale. They are professionals and when they organize by tens of thousands, unionism is legitimized among other professionals.

The New Revelation

"The three largest occupational groups in the white collar stratum," wrote C. Wright Mills, "are schoolteachers, salespeople . . . and assorted office workers." Of the three, teachers bring something special to labor.

The revelations about Dave Beck sullied the good name of labor. But it is virtually impossible to imagine a teacher as a stereotyped "Labor Czar" with a college degree. When teachers come to unionism, obviously of their own free will, it is evident that the ideals of organized labor stir educated people and appeal to professional pride and intellectual dignity. This becomes a spectacular new "revelation" about unionism. At the same time, the entry of newly organized teachers brings a new spirit of democracy into the labor movement. Only such unionism can win their freely given loyalty. That is the story of the U.F.T. in New York.

The United Federation of Teachers was formed in March 1960, by the merger of the Teachers Guild and a group that had broken away from the Secondary School Teachers' Association. The Guild had been a long-time AFL affiliate, held together for twenty years by a band of old-time socialistic anti-Communists, informed, devoted, but passive and determinedly tiny. Around 1955, without any special membership drive, young teachers began to join on their own, a few here, a few more there. The new recruits were energetic modern liberals who soon infused the sleeping old Guild with a new spirit of union militancy: mass petitions, picket demonstrations, delegations, rallies. Meanwhile, the Independent SSTA had been formed as a more sedate "professional" type of association. It, too, attracted militant young teachers in the high schools who soon forced its reluctant leadership to step to the head of a stoppage in the evening schools. But the younger activists could not adjust to a staid, conservative, inactive leadership and left in a body to join with the Guild in founding the U. F. T.

The UFT started with about 3,000 members and quickly rose to 6,000 and later to 10,000. It set up lively chapters in the schools; it worked up a grievance machinery, demanded improved salaries and working conditions, insisted upon a collective bargaining election. It acted like a genuine union, and a militant one. After more than a year of constant, pointless, fruitless run-around during which promises slowly and begrudgingly made to it were promptly forgotten, the UFT took the plunge and called a teachers' strike in November of 1960. It was the first of its kind in New York City and ten thousand responded on the first morning. The strike was settled after one day when the Mayor stipulated to a com-

mittee of eminent labor leaders (David Dubinsky, Harry Van Arsdale, Jacob Potofsky) that an early collective bargaining election could be held. After further stalling—and some political changes—an election was ordered to take place before December 15.

The Union Spirit

The UFT is the kind of union that has slipped out of mind. It is so obviously a members' union that it reminds us of what unionism really is. During an intense and hectic organizing campaign the combined full-time union staff was three. The office staff was seven including bookkeepers, switchboard operators, stenographers, and office manager. To keep track of 10,000 members scattered through a thousand schools and to follow up potential recruits, UFT activists pitched in as free volunteers after school hours. A typical Friday showed the two small office rooms jammed with teachers. In one corner, a half dozen are busy with a mailing. A battery of phones is operated by others who call delinquents for back dues. An editorial committee is busy on one side. Across the room, the grievance committee is mulling over complaints. The scene is startlingly reminiscent of the dedicated labor and liberal groups of the thirties, the same enthusiasm, the air of idealism, the effort to cram two lifetimes into one.

There are no paper committees. The grievance committee, legislative committee, special committees for high schools, evening schools, elementary schools are all active, conscientious and unpaid.

Most important is the Delegates Assembly. Full membership meetings are called twice a year, frankly as rallies; for no such mass gathering could have genuine deliberative or legislative function; and UFT democracy is not a facade. The Delegates Assembly is the broad ruling body, 600 representatives elected by organized chapters, to one-year terms, one delegate for each ten members. Two to four hundred delegates come to the monthly Assembly meetings, large enough to give adequate representation to members, small enough to discuss the affairs of a large movement with reasonable parliamentary facility. It is not easy and can be perfected only with experience, for this is no rubber stamp. A hundred or more able speakers are not shy about modifying or rejecting recommendations from their Executive Board.

Among the fifty Executive Board members you detect no resemblance to the officious

bureaucrat type. These are working teachers who give most of their spare time to their union and spark its committees. Their average age is around 35; many are still in their twenties. They serve two years, meet twice a month, and elect a small Administrative Committee to conduct the union's daily affairs. The dozen top officers, from President down, are elected in membership referendum.

This fresh, new, democratic union of professionals will be heard from. It is destined to become the bargaining agent for 40,000 New York teachers. As labor's perplexed brain trusters and worried leaders, assembled at seminars and institutes, to ponder the annoying problem of white-collar organization, they need only peer outside the lecture hall. There is the United Federation of Teachers. It has uncovered the secret of white-collar organization and those who are able, can see. One key is democracy.

Fraternal Greetings

FOUR

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P.O. Box 175, Radio City Station,
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LEGACY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

Lewis Coser

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION and LENINISM OR MARXISM by Rosa Luxemburg. Ann Arbor Paperbacks, The University of Michigan Press, 1961. 109 pp. \$1.65.

TERRORISM AND COMMUNISM by Leon Trotsky with a preface and an introduction by Leon Trotsky and a foreword by Max Shachtman. Ann Arbor Paperbacks, The University of Michigan Press, 1961. Pp. XLVII and 191. \$1.95.

THE ORIGIN OF RUSSIAN COMMUNISM by Nicolas Berdyaev. Ann Arbor Paperbacks, The University of Michigan Press, 1960. Pp. 191. \$1.65.

Pronouncements about the "end of ideology" abound recently, even among many former socialists. Yet, to judge from the wide interest in the tradition of socialism among college students, the demise of socialist ideology is not at hand. That these three classics in the history of socialist thought are now being made available at reasonable prices to a wide audience—after having been out of print for a very long time—is, in itself, a welcome sign. These volumes belong in the library of every radical in America.

A comparison of Rosa Luxemburg's *Russian Revolution* and Trotsky's volume is most instructive. Both were written in the first years of the Russian Revolution. Rosa composed her little book in her German prison cell in 1918; Trotsky's was written, as he says, "in 1920, in the car of a military train and amid the flames of civil war." Trotsky at the time of writing was one of the main actors in the drama of the Revolution; Rosa Luxemburg was but a passionately involved spectator. And yet, when one now rereads their books with the perspective that subsequent history has made avail-

able, he cannot but feel that the outsider possessed extraordinary lucidity, an almost uncanny ability to predict subsequent developments, while the involved insider proved to be blind to those flaws in the Revolution which would later contribute to its final decay.

Rosa Luxemburg, as distinct from the great majority of German socialists, greeted the revolution with enthusiasm. She saw in it the first major sign of hope after the years of senseless slaughter of the First World War. But her enthusiasm did not lead her to gloss over the major defects in Lenin's strategy, and in the policy of the Bolsheviks. She had expressed in earlier years her misgivings about bolshevism—especially in a seminal article in the *Neue Zeit* which is here reprinted under the title *Leninism and Marxism*—and she was, therefore, not unprepared for the strategy that Lenin and his followers were to apply. Trotsky, before the war, had also attacked Lenin's principle of organization along quite similar lines. Yet, in the early years of the Revolution, he became the most vigorous, uncompromising, and articulate exponent of the very doctrine of bolshevist dictatorship which he had criticized in years gone by. Perhaps, beyond the differences in temperament and intellectual orientation of particular individuals, one might discern here a more general principle: The insider, driven by the compulsions of action, often intoxicated with the power that he can wield, finds it especially hard to discern the flaws in an act of history with which he is so deeply involved that it has become, so to speak, a part of his own ego. The outsider, on the other hand, no matter how deeply

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he may identify with the historical action he is observing, yet can afford to maintain psychological, as well as political, distance.

The Prophetic Genius

Trotsky, as we shall see in a moment, was driven to tortuous and strained efforts at reasoning away the lack of freedom in the early years of the Revolution. For Rosa Luxemburg, the problem was clear and simple—"Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for the members of one party . . . is no freedom at all. Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently." When freedom becomes a special privilege for those who think aright, she states in sentences that remind one of J. Stuart Mill, it loses its "purifying" character. Luxemburg noted that in Lenin's neo-Jacobin theory of dictatorship the "social transformation is something for which a ready-made formula lies completed in the pockets of the revolutionary party, which needs only to be carried out energetically in practice." She derived from this general conception of centralized action the basic defects in Leninist practice.

Her pamphlet deals with a number of particular problems such as the "nationalities question," land policy and the like, but these are finally of minor importance when seen against her major point: a socialist Revolution must rely on awakening the creative potential which lies buried in the masses of the ordinary people; it can be successful only to the extent that it harnesses to its task those untapped social energies which have lain fallow under the dictatorships of the Tsars. Any attempt to dictate to the masses by an all-knowing Central Committee is necessarily a regressive step, since it amounts to reinstating, under new conditions, the age-old distinction between the passive mass, and the all-knowing elite. Socialism, to Rosa, can only come about through the autonomous actions of the aroused masses of the population: "The only way to a rebirth is the school of public life itself, the most unlimited, the broadest democracy and public opinion. It is rule by terror which demoralizes," Rosa concluded on the penultimate page of her pamphlet. And on her last page she wrote: "Such conditions, (i.e., the dictatorship of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks) must inevitably cause a brutalization of public life, attempted assassinations, shooting of hostages, etc." With prophetic genius, Rosa Lux-

emburg in her lonely prison cell had already foreseen the horror and tragedy of the subsequent course of the Revolution.

Luxemburg may have been a political romantic. Indeed, some of her writings on the spontaneous virtuosity of the working class sometimes remind one of romantic dreams about the purity of primitives; but how much more appealing is even such romanticism when contrasted with Trotsky's hard-headed Communist *Realpolitik* in his *Terrorism and Communism*. That Trotsky was a uniquely gifted revolutionary leader, that he was selflessly devoted to the ideals of the Revolution, there can be no doubt. But he also seems to have possessed, at least in those years when he was a key actor, an almost unlimited capacity for self-delusion. (In later years, as an exile in Turkey, France, Norway, and Mexico, he gained at least a partial detachment, yet without ever reaching the lucidity about the basic flaws in the Russian Revolution which seems to have come to Rosa Luxemburg quite "spontaneously.")

Hard-headed Realpolitik

In the years before the revolution Trotsky had attacked Bolshevik centralism and Leninist authoritarianism from the perspective of democratic and libertarian socialism. But in 1920, caught in the maelstrom of the Revolution, compelled by events even though he meant to compel them, Trotsky reasoned from efficiency and expediency rather than from principle. The country was devastated and urgently needed industrial reconstruction; voluntary labor was hard to come by and to organize—very well then, compulsory work and labor armies organized with military discipline were the answer. The menshevik critic Abramovich opposed such forced labor battalions and asked, "wherein does your socialism differ from Egyptian slavery? It was just by similar methods that the Pharaohs built the pyramids, forcing the masses to labor." Trotsky answered "Abramovich sees no difference between the Egyptian regime and our own. He has forgotten the class nature of government . . . it was not the Egyptian peasants who decided through their soviets to build the pyramids . . . our compulsion is applied by a workers' and peasants' government, in the name of the interests of the laboring masses."

To Trotsky, there existed no link between means and ends. If the end was good, then any means acquired its justification by being

conducive to the end. It is in this light that he could argue with appalling sophistry that, though socialism implied the abolition of the state, "the road to Socialism lies through a period of the highest possible intensification of the principle of the State. . . . Just as a lamp, before going out, shoots up in a brilliant flame, so the State, before disappearing, assumes the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the most ruthless form of State, which embraces the life of the citizens authoritatively in every direction."

The Moral Blemish

Only a few years after these lines were written, Trotsky became a most courageous and forceful critic of the lack of democracy and the bureaucratic degeneracy in Russian state and society. Yet one may wonder in how many cases his appeal fell on deaf ears among socialists who only a very few years earlier had heard him expound his totalitarian State doctrine. A man's past actions cannot be obliterated that easily from the minds of a generation. And even those of us who can look back at these events with the detachment of historical distance cannot help but feel, though Trotsky was a man of heroic cast, one of the few great men of the twentieth century, he was deeply blemished as a moral leader. When his Stalinist adversaries applied to him his own moral logic: "The means do not matter, only the goal counts," his answers remained, of necessity, ambiguous, since he was never willing to renounce this principle. And, finally, the Stalinists eliminated the remaining obstacle to their goal of total domination over the Communist movement by means of a pickaxe crushing his brains. . . .

An Examination of Roots

Nicolas Berdyaev's study belongs to a somewhat different universe of discourse than the two others. Though the author had been drawn to socialism in his youth, he turned away from it fairly early to develop a version of Christian existentialism strongly admixed with elements of German idealism and gnostic mysticism. After having occupied a chair of philosophy at Moscow University in the early years of the Russian revolution, he was expelled from the Soviet Union in 1922 and wrote his major works in exile.

Though *The Origins of Russian Communism* is not free from the typical resentment of the political refugee, though many

of its assessments of the bolshevik regime are quite obviously biased, it remains nevertheless, a most important study. Especially the opening chapters, which trace certain characteristics of Russian socialism to the peculiar rootlessness of the nineteenth century Russian intelligentsia, are exceedingly brilliant. Berdyaev stresses the rigid dogmatism, the receptivity to general and totalitarian explanatory schemes, the tendency to think in large-scale abstract categories, and the striving toward radical wholeness, to the alienation of the intelligentsia from all significant social forces. The inability to act in social reality became transmuted into an almost luxuriant Utopian and Messianic imagination. We now have a number of more detailed investigations of this intellectual tradition, which will probably call for a revision of some of Berdyaev's judgments, but his book is still a useful guide to the prehistory of Marxism in Russia. It helps us to understand that Leninism, far from being an extraneous strain in the fabric of Russian social thought, was built upon salient elements in the Russian tradition, while at the same time revolting against this tradition, and, ultimately, destroying it.

GREETINGS

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